

REPORT OF THE LEBANON INDEPENDENT BORDER ASSESSMENT TEAM

Executive summary

1. Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) “calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and all entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel...”. At the request of the Lebanese Government a UN team of border police experts was dispatched to Lebanon in September 2006 and February 2007 to assess the situation along the border and provide the Security Council on findings and recommendations. The Security Council’s Presidential statement of 17 April 2007 invites the Secretary General “*to dispatch at the earliest, in close liaison with the Lebanese Government, an independent assessment mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border...and to report back to the Council...on its findings and recommendations in this regard*”.

2. From the 27 May to the 15 June 2007, the UN Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) was dispatched to Lebanon. LIBAT worked in close cooperation with the Lebanese Government and border security authorities and received unimpeded support in its efforts to assess all aspects of Lebanese border security with special emphasis on preventive measures against arms smuggling. LIBAT held talks with government officials, the directors of the four agencies directly involved in border security management, the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Security, Internal Security Forces and General Customs.

4. All four land border crossing points and a further one to be operational as of July 2007 were visited as well as the International Airport of Beirut and the Beirut Seaport. A number of locations along the Green Border to Syria were visited in order to assess the diverse conditions of the border, including the different forms of terrain, the extraordinary conditions created by the Palestinian cross-border military strongholds and areas affected by border delineation disputes.

5. LIBAT observed during talks and field visits, that the level of cooperation and coordination, in particular in the fields of inter-agency information sharing and joint planning, was rather low. As a natural result of the long period of no traditional land border and consequently very limited border security management, only a small amount of experience and border management related expertise are accumulated within the four agencies. One example is the deployment of forces along the Green Border, where observation posts and checkpoints appear to be located within traditional military doctrines and aimed more at territorial defense rather than establish smuggling preventive border surveillance.

6. The design and layout of the Border Crossing Points do not fully fulfill the needs for a controlled area designated for border security activities. In addition, there is a lack of prescribed procedures for the activities related to a Border Crossing Point, resulting in a non-controllable passengers, vehicles and cargo flow within the facilities.

7. Training in traditional border security skills would provide the agencies involved with the necessary know-how of how to counter or improve these conditions.

8. LIBAT found widespread professional will to secure the borders of Lebanon. It also found that the border security agencies had introduced some improvement measures on border

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management efficiency, in part based on the previous UN assessment teams' recommendations, on the bilateral assistance provided by the Government of Germany and on the equipment donated by other nations.

9. However, LIBAT also assessed that the present state of border security was insufficient to prevent smuggling, in particular the smuggling of arms, to any significant extent. The assessment was further strengthened by the fact that not a single on-border or near-border seizure of smuggled arms has been documented to the team.

10. There is still substantial room for improvements on the Lebanese border security management, some of which can only be reached through assistance and support from the international community.

11. It is, however, also worth pointing out that a number of recommendations from both previous assessments and recommendations incorporated in this report can be implemented by the Lebanese authorities on their own without significant financial implications and without changes in the organizational structure of the border management agencies.

Based on its observations, assessment and conclusions, LIBAT presents the following key recommendations:

- Establish a Multi-agency mobile force focusing on arms smuggling with the purpose of creating seizure results within a short time span through its intelligence and rapid interception capabilities. An additional purpose would be to serve as the “role-model” for the other border security agencies and to serve as a platform for a possible future dedicated border guard agency.
- Establish an Intelligence & Analysis component embedded within the Multi-agency unit with the purpose of gaining access to all border security relevant intelligence from the four agencies, analyse and provide the four agencies and the Multi-agency force with targets identified with a high likelihood of apprehension.
- Deployment of international border security experts to the Multi-agency unit and its embedded intelligence and analysis cell, to all four agencies on all levels, but in particular on the operational level in order to advise on non-military border security aspects and follow up on performed training and to an advisory secretariat consisting of both international advisors and representatives from the Lebanese border security agencies
- Establish a dedicated Border Guard agency as part of a long term strategy in order to streamline border security execution, gather all expertise, information and intelligence in one agency.
- Establish full and absolute control over Border Crossing Points by: creating Standard Operation Procedures for the BCPs including regulations for any movement inside the control area of persons, vehicles and goods, standardized obligatory measures for checking, anti corruption mechanisms, and modify the infrastructures where appropriate.

- Initiate measures to separate legal and illegal border-near or border crossing activities with the purpose of creating a transparent and unambiguous environment, such as restricting movements in some areas, marking the border line, establishing additional local border crossing points, relocation of BCP to the border line and providing socio-economic programmes as an alternative to families' reliance on smuggling.
- Establish training programs for the four agencies and all levels within these in order to transform the border security concept and doctrines into a highly professional and skilled civilian mindset, if possible building on or drawing from the training aspect of the Northern Border Pilot Project, implementing practical aspects of the internationally agreed Integrated Border Management concept on cooperation and coordination, intelligence gathering, technical and tactical skills, as well as risk analysis.
- Continue and enhance border specific equipment support for all agencies with the purpose of increasing efficiency and serve as force multiplier including among others air and land surveillance equipment, communication equipment, vehicles, scanners, other inspection methods, and all required computer hardware and software.
- Establish cooperation with Syrian counterparts, also and in particular at the operational level, as a precondition for an optimum in border security management is a joint effort to secure the border and prevent illegal cross-border activities

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I. Background

1. United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) put a halt to the war between Israel and Lebanon which erupted on 12 July 2006, as a result of the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. The resolution was passed by the UN Security Council on 11 August 2006, and a cease-fire came into place on 14 August, 33 days after the war. The resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the respect of a cease-fire, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River and the strengthening of the mandate of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

2. Several components of UNSCR 1701 (2006) have a direct relation with the notion of border control and border security. In operative paragraph 8, it calls on Lebanon and Israel to respect, inter alia, the following principles, of “*no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government and no sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government*”. Further in operative paragraph 14, it “*Calls upon the government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms and related materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request*”.

3. In reply to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s request to the German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Angela Merkel, dated 25 August 2006, a joint Federal Police/Customs Project Office was set up in Beirut on 7 September 2006 based on a bilateral agreement. A team of experts from the German Federal Police and Customs (5 experts from each) arrived in Lebanon with the following mission: to advise the Lebanese security authorities tasked with border protection and customs duties on formulating a national border control strategy; to evaluate the current standards of equipment available and supply some where it appears appropriate and to provide incident-related training assistance to the Lebanese security authorities in charge of border protection and customs where it appears appropriate.

4. As part of the bilaterally agreed mandate, the Federal Police/Customs Project Office carried out an evaluation of the situation at the Lebanese security authorities in charge of border control and collection of customs duties, with the exception of the borders South of the Litani River, under the mandate of UNIFIL. On the basis of the findings, the Federal Police/Customs Project Office formulated a proposal for Lebanese integrated border management. As a starting point, a pilot project was launched in the northern region, completing improvements, of facilities at the international airport and the sea ports. The overall objective of the pilot project is to gain experience to allow the Lebanese authorities to develop an integrated border management strategy for the entire country. The implementation phase of the pilot project will start in September 2007 and is expected to be finalized by the end of 2007 and might be extended afterwards to the eastern border.

5. In September 2006, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted a brief assessment of the existing security measures in place to secure Lebanon's borders. The assessment report highlighted the coordination structures put in place by the Government, and a number of shortcomings in matters of coordination, equipment and training. Between 25 February and 3 March 2007, the DPKO Border Police expert team returned to Lebanon in order to assess whether the changes recommended in its first report had been implemented by the various authorities. In their view, this second assessment revealed both "encouraging and disappointing findings". But the report also acknowledged that the time available to the Government of Lebanon between the submission of the first report and the second assessment, in some cases, did not allow for a full implementation of the recommended measures.

6. The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), dated 14 March 2007, mentioned increased reports of regular smuggling of arms across the border from Syria to Lebanon and the measures put in place by the Government of Lebanon to improve its management of the border. The report mentioned that the DPKO assessment team had suggested a follow up mission within four to six months to allow the Government of Lebanon adequate time to implement the recommended improvements.

7. The statement S/PRST/2007/12 by the President of the Security Council dated 17 April 2007 welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to evaluate the situation along the entire border and invited him to dispatch at the earliest, in close liaison with the Lebanese Government, an independent mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border and keep the Council informed on its contacts with the Lebanese Government, and to report back to the Council on its findings and recommendations in this regard.

II. The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT), its mandate, approach and methodology

Mandate

8. Based on the recommendations of the second DPKO Police Expert mission report and the UNSC Presidential statement, the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was entrusted to gather experts in Customs, Border Police and Military issues, and established the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT). On 27 May 2007, the team comprising of Mr. Lasse Christensen, Team leader (Denmark), Mr. El Hadi Salah (Algeria), Mr Franz Vogl (Germany), Ms. Sherrone Blake Lobban (Jamaica) and Mr. Gilbert Barthe (Switzerland) convened in Beirut for a three weeks field mission with the following mandate:

- fully assess current border security and the monitoring of the "Green border", including its official crossing points,
- provide specific recommendations to the Secretary-General, on measures and assistance strategies leading to the enhancement of border security along the entire length of Lebanon's approx. 320 km border with the Syrian Arab Republic,

- review the roles of all the agencies involved in border security¹, with particular attention to current national customs and border monitoring capacities, as well as progress made by security and customs agencies in strengthening their control of the border in compliance with resolution 1701 (2006), and identify major obstacles hindering the effective strengthening of that control,
- analyze the findings of the previous DPKO border police expert team's two visits to Lebanon (in September 2006 and February 2007) and build on its recommendations, with specific focus on the designing of an integrated border management project, as well as possible training and development opportunities, working in close consultation with the above-mentioned agencies and with German experts, currently conducting a bilateral assistance pilot project on border security enhancement in the north of the country,
- liaise closely with the aforementioned German team and with above-mentioned agencies and develop a set of standards for border entry points, including recommendations on the reconstruction and refurbishment of critical infrastructure along the border.

The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team is expected to report to the Security Council on its findings and recommendations prior to the submission of the June report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

Approach

9. As a starting point, the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) found it appropriate to research on definitions of the notions of Border Security and Integrated Border Management (IBM), in order to clearly define the focus and scope of its mandate. Border security and Integrated Border Management are essential to the promotion of open and secure borders. The challenge is to find ways of enhancing border security to a level proportional to the threats of illegal cross-border activities, while facilitating legitimate travel and commerce, protecting human rights and promoting human contacts². The latter is essential when considering the close linkages border populations enjoy at the Lebanese-Syrian border.

10. There exists a variety of interpretations for the concept of Integrated Border Management. The Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, for example agreed on the following dimensions as constituting the conceptual framework of Integrated Border Management³:

1. Border control (checks and surveillance) including risk analysis and crime intelligence;
2. Detecting and investigating "cross-border crime" in cooperation with all the relevant law enforcement authorities;
3. The four-tier/filter access control model, which as stipulated in the EU Schengen Catalogue of 2002 includes measures in third countries of origin or transit, cooperation with neighboring countries, measures on border control at the external borders and control measures within the common area of free movement;

¹ Internal Security Forces, General Security, General Customs and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

² <http://www.osce.org/activities/13030.html>

³ Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, 2768th Council Meeting in Brussels on 4/5 December 2006.

4. Inter-agency cooperation in border management including border guards, customs and police, national security and other relevant authorities;
5. Coordination and coherence at the national and transnational level.

11. IBM relies on full professionalism and inter-institutional co-ordination. Furthermore, its proper implementation requires a clear definition of the respective powers, functional responsibilities, roles and missions of police, customs authorities and military, as well as the conditions for the transfer of responsibilities from the military to the civilian authority as soon as the situation permits. It also includes the enhancement or establishment of appropriate mechanisms for regular exchange and joint assessment of information at bilateral and regional levels⁴. The German Team implementing the capacity building project in Northern Lebanon has based its strategy on the conceptual framework of IBM.

Methodology

12. LIBAT carried out its mandate in close partnership with the Lebanese Government and all its security agencies. This approach was greatly facilitated by the Government's total readiness to receive and support the mission, to benefit from the mission's advice, recommendations and from the potential support to border management that the LIBAT report could generate. At the highest level, LIBAT met with the Prime Minister. LIBAT consulted regularly with Lebanese security authorities in their Beirut headquarters, meeting with the Commanders or Directors of the four security agencies, and, as needs arose, with their Officers in charge. The Team carried out field visits to all official Border Crossing Points (BCP) and many specific areas of the Green border. In addition, the Team could observe a large part of the Syrian border during a helicopter flight. LIBAT's assessment focussed on the technical aspects of border security and border managements. Nevertheless, the Team could not ignore some specific political/security situations at a few locations on the border which have a direct impact on the Lebanese ability to manage and control the border.

Support offered to the Team

13. LIBAT's activities in Lebanon benefited from the outstanding support of both the Lebanese Authorities and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). LIBAT consulted closely with the Special Coordinator for the Secretary General and his political advisors. A close protection unit ensured both personal and movement security and the logistics. On the other hand, the Lebanese Security agencies offered the highest level of cooperation to LIBAT, and accommodated all the team's requests for visiting any specific locations or meeting with any official.

Constraints

14. Beside the extremely positive notes of the previous paragraphs, LIBAT faced some constraints of different levels or nature. During LIBAT's visits to the field (BCPs and Green border), the Team was escorted by the UN, provided close protection unit and vehicles from the Internal Security Forces, complemented with LAF military intelligence and regional commanders. Visually, LIBAT's convoy would consist of at least six black 4x4 vehicles plus two LAF military vehicles from the area. Approximately 10 persons, comprising of LIBAT five experts and LAF

⁴ NATO, Common Platform of the Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management, 22-23 May 2003

commanders would meet in the offices of the various authorities in charge at the border. This made the interaction of the mission with local officials formal and rigid. At some occasions, they appeared to be careful and almost defensive in their discussions in front of such a high level audience.

15. In general, the time available to the Team to carry out its assessment did not allow for building real working relations with the local authorities in charge at the borders, and offered little possibility to verify or cross-check some statements made in front of the Team (and its entourage). The fact that Syria had closed its border operations at the three northern border posts, following the armed operations against the Palestinian camp of Nahr-el-Bared, did not allow LIBAT to witness the border authorities performing their duties. Also, the time spent at some locations near Palestinian strongholds at the Syrian border was rather short, for security reasons.

III. Situation

A. Border description

16. Lebanon covers an area of 10.452 square kilometers and borders on Syria in the north and in the east and on Israel in the south. The coastal waters of the Mediterranean Sea mark off the Lebanese territory in the west. The responsibility for supporting the Lebanese Government in the surveillance of the sea border and the area south of the Litani River has been placed on UNIFIL and therefore the assessment of border security at this section of the border is not included in the mandate of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT).

17. The land border to the north with a length of approx. 44 km in a straight line has the following characteristics: The Nahr el Kabir River in the north having its source in the area of Sahlet el Bqaiia and flowing into the Mediterranean Sea. This small river, sometimes only a few meters wide and with many shallow points at the same time describes the course of the Border Line along its length of approximately 65 km; east of the source of the Nahr el Kabir River the border area is marked off by the foothills of the strongly rugged Mount Lebanon (up to 3.083 meters high) extending until the North-eastern border. The border area from the coastal waters till the source of the Nahr el Kabir River can be described as flat in the beginning with a dense settlement. Further in the interior of the country the terrain becomes hilly with scattered settlements and quite close vegetation of bushes and trees. Further to the east the terrain is slightly uphill and finally reaches the foothills of the Mount Lebanon (up to 830 meters high).

18. The land border to the east is followed by the arid mountain range Anti-Lebanon and the Hermon Mountain up to a maximum of 2,629 meters or 2,814 meters respectively. The terrain is very rocky and partially inaccessible with barren vegetation only at higher altitudes. At lower altitudes there is only thin vegetation with bushes and cedar trees. Settlements can be found only at the base of mountains or in the hinterland. The land borders to Syria in the north and in the east extend to approximately 320 km in all. The border is partially marked off by natural borders, e.g. the Nahr el Kabir River in the north or banks of earth up to 2 meter high in the east but so far no delineation and demarcation of the Lebanese – Syrian land border took place⁵.

⁵ A UN cartography unit is working on this issue for the stretches of the land border for which an understanding on the border course with Syria exists. For the other disputed parts (e.g. Jabal el Mazar, near Deir el Aachayer and Halimet Quarah), a Lebanese-Syrian intergovernmental committee has been established, however no indication was given concerning the timing of the expected results.

19. Legal entry into and departure from Lebanon takes place through four official land Border Crossing Points (BCP) at Arida and El Aboudieh in the north and Kaa and Masnaa in the east. Further BCPs are Beirut airport and the seaports of Beirut and Tripoli. Another BCP in the north-east, Bokayaa, will open in July. Numerous trails and pathways are crossing the “Green Border” in the North and in the East thus making it possible for smugglers, illegal trafficking and foreign infiltrators/terrorists to cross the border besides the official Border Crossing Points. These trails and pathways are suitable for both small scale and large scale smuggling activities.

20. On the eastern border, inhabitants rely heavily on cross-border commerce, technically illegal but neither controlled nor prevented by the Lebanese or Syrian border authorities. As examples, in the village of El Qasr Lebanese farmers cross the border in order to cultivate fields on the Syrian side. Lebanese children living on the Syrian side cross the border in order to visit schools on the Lebanese side of the border. These movements are technically illegal and require solutions at the political level and appropriate measures from the Lebanese border authorities as well.

21. A major concern in terms of border security lies in several heavily armed Palestinian military strongholds covering both sides the Border Line. These camps constitute pockets of territories where the Lebanese Security Forces are denied the possibility to exercise their mandate. The LAF is confining itself to control and seal off the surroundings of these camps, like in Haloua, southeast of Masnaa.

B. The agencies in charge of border management and their mandate

22. The management of the border is shared by four different Security Agencies, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Internal Security Forces, the General Security and the General Customs. General Customs itself is divided into the Customs Office and the Customs Brigade with specific and complementary tasks. The overall staffing of the Lebanese Armed Forces is of 64,000⁶, 15,000 of whom are engaged along the Israeli border and 5,000 to 8,000 are engaged in border security along the Syrian border.

23. The mission of the **Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)** as indicated on their website⁷ is the following :

- a) “facing the Israeli occupation and its perpetual aggression in South Lebanon and West Bekaa and supporting the steadfastness of Lebanese citizens to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces to internationally recognized borders;
- b) defending the country and its citizens against all aggression;
- c) confronting all threats against the country’s vital interests;
- d) coordinating with Arab armies in accordance with ratified treaties and agreements;
- e) maintaining internal security and stability;
- f) engaging in social and humanitarian activities according to national interests;
- g) undertaking relief operations in coordination with other public and humanitarian institutions.”

⁶ According to the Jaffee Center's Middle East Military Balance

⁷ www.lebarmy.gov.lb

At several occasions, when discussing the role of the units based along the border area, the LAF Brigade and Regiment commanders in the field have summarized their mission to LIBAT as follows:

- a) defence of the country against “foreign aggression”;
- b) maintaining the internal law and order;
- c) border control for personnel and goods (or preventing the smuggling of people/arms/goods from Syria into the Lebanese territory).

24. The **Internal Security Force (ISF)** is a police force subject to the Minister of Interior’s authority, but following the military laws and rules in general. The Legislative decree no 139 dated 12/6/1959 broadly defines the ISF mandate as contributing to the general security by controlling the land, sea and air borders and by monitoring foreigners in Lebanon. The law No.17 dated 6/9/1990 defines the ISF as public armed forces whose jurisdiction covers the whole Lebanese territory, the territorial waters and airspace. Parts of the ISF mission related to the aspects of border security are the following:

- a) to keep order and security;
- b) to assure public order;
- c) implement the missions of the judicial police; and
- d) support the public authorities in carrying out their duties.

More specifically, the ISF can execute its mission by:

- a) requesting identity documents;
- b) searching persons;
- c) arresting persons (in application of a legal judgement or warrant or immediately in the act);
- d) entering houses;
- e) seizing prohibited substances;
- f) establishing check-points; and
- g) using arms when arresting suspected persons under certain conditions and specified situations.

The ISF also has the duty to report any crime they are witness to or those reported to them.

25. The **General Security (GS)** agency operates based on the Legislative decree no 139 dated 12/ 06 /1959 defining its general task as gathering information for the government, in particular political, economic and social information and to carry out criminal investigations on violations committed against the internal and external state security. The GS supports the Internal Security Force in controlling the land, sea and air borders, issuing entry visas for foreigners and in the monitoring of the foreigners residing in Lebanon. The GS controls entry of foreigners into the country, their residence, their departure, their movements, and organizes and delivers travel documents for the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon or coming from foreign countries.

The GS describes its Security functions as follows:

- a) collect political, economic and social information for the benefit of the government;
- b) evaluate, analyze and exploit information in different domains;
- c) participate in judicial investigations within the frame of offences committed against the internal or external security of the state;
- d) supervise the preparation and implementation of security measures;
- e) cooperate in different functions on security matters;

- f) prepare wanted notices and the prosecutions related to wanted persons, travelling bans and entry restrictions to the country and
- g) participating in the control of the land, sea and air borders.

26. The **Lebanese Customs** is headed by a High Council of Customs, acting as an overall legislative and nominating authority. The Lebanese customs is part of the Ministry of Finance, but acts as an independent authority. Collected Customs duties and VAT are forwarded to the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The execution of the Lebanese Customs mandate is entrusted to the General Customs, managed by the General Director. The General Customs comprises of two main departments, Customs Office with 470 civilian staff and Customs Brigade with 1320 uniformed staff. The Customs Office Department includes a division of smuggling control. According to an existing five years recruitment plan, both departments have requested a higher number of staff, 2635 for the Customs Brigade and 591 for the Customs Office. The current economic crisis has not allowed for sufficient funding for the recruitment of additional officers.

27. The Customs Office Department is in charge of the following tasks at the legal border crossing points:

- a) collection of Customs duties, Excise taxes, and Value Added Tax in a fair and accurate manner;
- b) prevention of smuggling and detection of fraudulent practices against Customs and related laws;
- c) clearance of persons, their baggage, cargo, and mail;
- d) protection of the general welfare of Lebanon by enforcing import and export restrictions and prohibitions; and
- e) provision of accurate international trade statistics for the public and trading community.

28. The Customs Brigade and its units, in charge of controlling the border line, have the following mandate⁸:

- a) controlling the land, sea and air borders and other territories which are subject to the Customs' control in order to implement the laws, custom's regulations and different rules that handle the import, export and ownership of goods;
- b) detecting fraud, according to the law of customs and other regulations and establishing checkpoints in order to scrutinize people's movement;
- c) providing support to the civilian Customs Office; and
- d) assisting all the military forces and the official administrations in accordance with the rules and cases mentioned in the ongoing laws.

C. The Situation as seen by the Lebanese key players in border management

29. During the nearly 30 years of Syrian presence and influence inside Lebanon, no concept of border security at the Lebanon-Syrian border was ever implemented. Consequently, this situation led to the arrival of a significant Syrian workforce into Lebanon and to the creation of politico-commercial networks across the border for which there was no real obligation to abide by the legislations on movements of goods and persons. Along the same line, border agencies were not encouraged to cooperate under the Syrian presence. Such situation generated a low working ethic, morale and motivation amongst the agencies' personnel. The Lebanese Government and its security

⁸ According to decree 2868 dated 6/12/1959 and decree 4461 dated 15/12/2000

forces and authorities began to be really involved in border management on the eastern border only in 2005 after the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon.

30. The ceasefire with Israel in 2006 and the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) required the revamping and deployment of elements of all security agencies on the Syrian border. All the security agencies acknowledged a lack of experience and historical best practices in implementing real life border security and management. A Joint Border Security Committee, comprising of all the Heads of the Security Agencies and chaired by the ISF, was created as an advisory body to the government. The committee meets once a month and its short term strategy is to improve the current border management system. At the same time, the Committee was quite interested in any consideration pertaining to the creation of a specialized border security agency.

31. The various agencies were able to demonstrate to LIBAT their current efforts to manage and control border security at the Syrian border. In order to comply with the terms of resolution 1701 (2006), the Lebanese Armed Forces assigned a total of 8,600 staff to border control mission on the northern and eastern border. This staffing includes a contingent of 240 Internal Security Forces under LAF command. The internal events of May-June 2007 in the Palestinian camp of Nahr-El-Bared required however a reduction of 30 % in the number of LAF units in charge of border security and their redeployment to the inside. For the remaining approximately 5000 LAF in charge of border security, such a non-traditional mission for an army necessitates some level of coordination with the other agencies traditionally in charge of border security, the ISF, the General Customs and the General Security.

32. In his meeting with LIBAT, the Lebanese Prime Minister considers the land border with Syria as a major issue of concern, and expected that efforts in improving border management be carried out in the framework of tightening security against armed threats, such as smuggling of weapons and personnel for terrorist purposes. The Government also deplores the non recognition by Syria of their common border, and the non-existence of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Such a situation has a negative impact on cross-border security issues. Parts of the Lebanese borders are considered safe of arms smuggling, firstly the southern part, due to the heavy LAF presence and UNIFIL and secondly, the coastal line due to the International Maritime Task Force.

33. The Joint Border Security Committee and the agencies describe their priority as improving the control over security threatening cross-border smuggling such as illegal aliens with criminal/terrorists intentions, and deliveries of significant weaponry systems. The Committee and agencies could however not present to LIBAT a single case of intervention on such targets occurring during or following the immediate crossing of the border. In their views, the management of the border by all the different agencies has proven to be quite efficient, and the display of control points possibly a good deterrent to potential offenders.

34. Border security agencies indicated that smuggling of daily commodities between the border communities has always existed and continues to happen, and that agencies are rather tolerant when quantities of goods smuggled indicate a mere personal use. It was also pointed out to LIBAT that powerful cartels are still involved in lucrative smuggling, like cigarettes and fuel. Agencies are therefore working along a thin line of compromise, sometimes also in order not to alienate the support said to be received from the border communities in reporting important cases of smuggling. Those communities have always lived from cross-border trade, taking advantage of price differences

between the two countries. Local authorities pointed out that most of the Bekaa population has been involved in the culture of cannabis and poppies, and stopped it when the government intervened under the pressure of the international community. The latter promised alternative development projects which did not materialize and communities hence increased their involvement in smuggling.

35. Agencies in charge of border security acknowledge a lack of experience in implementing several tactical and technical aspects of their mission. For the official border posts, the Lebanese authorities acknowledge a need to review processes and the current infrastructure. As for the Green border, they indicate a lack of proper border surveillance observation equipment. The Lebanese authorities warmly welcomed the support and equipment provided so far by the donor countries, and especially the partnership with Germany for the project of integrated border management, whose pilot phase is currently ongoing. On the other hand, the need for cross-border cooperation with their Syrian counterparts was at several times pointed out, although some strategic bilateral meetings were reported to happen from time to time at higher level, mostly on border delineation and customs issues. As an example, the Governor of Bekaa meets with his Syrian counterpart, the Governor of Rif Dimajq through a Joint Syrian-Lebanese committee dealing with land ownership issues along the border line.

36. Border security agencies, especially the LAF, are very specific in highlighting the fact that the presence of Palestinian military strongholds on the Syrian border, represents a considerable obstacle to border management. It draws back units in charge of border surveillance and anti-smuggling missions to military deployment around such camps, reducing the number of troops available for border surveillance on the rest of the border. The LAF considers however the issue of armed Palestinian strongholds to be of a political nature, therefore requiring a political solution.

37. Due to specific political and security related events in Lebanon in the past two years and other budgetary considerations, an agency like General Customs could not obtain the authorization by the Council of Minister to fulfill its identified recruitment needs. This is quite relevant when considering that its uniformed and armed Brigade, 1,320 staff mostly tasked on the border line and outside the official border post, currently works with only 50% of its required staffing level. At the same time, the LAF acknowledges the need to train its border units with proper border security strategies, as they continue to fulfill this part of their mission with purely military defense tactics. At several occasions, security agencies and the Joint Border Security Committee pointed out the long term need for a dedicated border security agency, instead of allocating such task to the LAF.

D. International Support

38. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) calls, inter alia, on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. In the framework of resolution 1701 (2006) the international community committed itself, inter alia, to support Lebanon's security sector. An international donor coordination group (the European Commission, United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdoms) has been established to facilitate the coordination of the various capacity building projects in the Lebanese security sector. Those projects aim at enhancing the judiciary capabilities and the capacity of the Lebanese (police) forces (GS, GC, ISF and LAF) by providing training and funding of equipment.

39. Within the international donor coordination group, a donor “border management” subgroup (United States, Germany, Canada, France, Denmark, the United Kingdoms) has been established to facilitate the coordination of their engagements in the field of border security. Against the background of the German project implementing an Integrated Border Management in Lebanon, the donor “border management” subgroup is chaired by the Head of the German project. Regular donor subgroup meetings facilitate the coordination of projects and activities in terms of capacity building (training, equipment) for the benefit of Lebanon’s border authorities thus enhancing border security beyond the area of responsibility of UNIFIL.

IV. Facts and Findings

A. OFFICIAL BORDER CROSSINGS POINTS

a) Description and procedures at the official Border Crossing Points

40. Passengers and goods entering Lebanon by land must travel through one of the current four land border entry points: Arida (north of Tripoli along the coast) and El Aboudieh (northeast of Tripoli) in the north and Kaa (at the northern edge of the Békaa Valley) and Masnaa in the East (on the Beirut-Damascus Highway); another BCP, located at Bokayaa (northern Border), is currently under construction and expected to be operational by the beginning of July 2007. All BCPs are classified by Lebanese border security authorities into categories “A” and “B”, depending on the dimension of the perimeter and premises of each BCP and the volume of corresponding trans-border traffic (passengers, vehicles and goods). Statistics received from the offices of the Director of Customs shows that Masnaa handles the largest number of incoming and outgoing vehicles daily, whilst Aboudieh handles the second largest, Arida the third largest and Kaa handles the least amount of vehicles daily.

41. In general the premises of the BCPs are not located close to the Border Line; they are located at a distance of up to 13 km from it. Most of the perimeters of the BCPs are neither fenced nor secured by access gates and separation of incoming and outgoing vehicles and cargo within the premises at all of these border crossings is inadequate which makes it difficult to exercise control over the flux of passengers within the perimeter. In general, arrival and departure checks are not separated; they take place in the same terminal. A forward post, manned with staff from the border security authorities, could be found at each BCP close to the Border Line, with the exception of Arida.

42. Border security authorities performing immigration checks and customs clearance at the BCPs are GS, GC (Customs Civilians and Customs Brigade) and an Intelligence cell from the LAF, in order to possibly identify terrorists crossing the border and to supervise the operations of the agencies. The clearance procedures follow a general pattern, in that border crossers are cleared first by the General Security and then their goods are processed by the General Customs. Al Maasna is exceptional, because passengers are required to stop first at the General Customs for inspection and then go to the General Security for entry into the Lebanese territory. There are no female officers at any of the border crossing points. Customs clearance documentation is sent to Beirut for final logging

43. Passengers, vehicles and goods passing through a BCP have to undergo a three-stop-process which is as follows: Having arrived within the perimeter of the BCP, GS staff stops the passengers/vehicles individually and requests all passengers to report to GS inside the arrival terminal for immigration check. Counters for diplomats, foreigners and Lebanese passengers separate the passenger stream. Immigration check is computerised with regard to passports; customs clearance processes however are not computerised and documentation is sent to Beirut for logging. Data insertion of Lebanese and Syrian ID-cards is done manually. Arriving Syrian nationals are registered with the help of a form⁹ (“entry/exit-card”).

44. Vehicles have to queue until the process of checking the vehicle in front is completed. Once the immigration check is performed, the passengers return to their vehicles and proceed to the customs clearance of goods and cargo, which takes place in small terminals with separated lanes for vehicles and buses.¹⁰ Finally the passengers proceed to a “re-check position” manned by staff from GS making sure that the passenger has passed through all the positions and the forms are correct.

45. There are no defined and obvious procedures at all border crossing points that govern the selection and inspection of goods. Therefore, decisions are largely based on personal trust and intuition. Authorities did not present reports on seizure of weapons or ammunition at any of the four operational official border crossing points since the adoption of resolution 1701 (2006). However, officials at all levels have informed the Team that they are aware of cases of smuggling of gasoline, clothing and other consumer items, and that to a large extent this type of smuggling has been tolerated and treated as relatively unimportant.

46. At all BCPs, no bilateral co-operation between officials on both sides of the border takes place (sometimes the heads of the border security agencies do not know the names of their Syrian counterparts); also inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination is not very distinct at BCPs (e.g. day-to-day operational contact at the BCP, addressing practical questions such as the alignment of policies and practices where relevant, the development of new infrastructure, the possibility of sharing buildings or IT services, but also the development of common training for present and new staff).

b) Facts and Findings on border crossing points

BCP Arida¹¹

47. The Arida BCP is located near the coast northwest of the border to Syria and the premises are close to the Border Line. The stretch from the Syrian BCP to the Lebanese BCP is fenced. An access gate to this BCP (direction to Lebanon) exists but the perimeter is only partially fenced. The premises of the BCP are squeezed into a small location which is not large enough for trucks and cargo. However, separate exit and entrance exist for arriving and departing passengers. The immigration check for arriving and departing passengers takes place in the same terminal (no

⁹ One half of the form is issued to the passenger, the other half remains at the BCP for registration purposes (saved for 6 months).

¹⁰ Customs clearance of trucks takes place at separated cargo checking areas either within the perimeter of the BCP or at defined locations far away from the BCP (e.g. at Tripoli for cargo entering at BCPs Arida and El Aboudieh).

¹¹ At the time of the Team’s visit, no border crossing activities were seen due to the closure of the Syrian border post on the adjacent side, which is believed to be a result of the fightings in the Nahr el-Bared camp in Tripoli. Despite this, the Lebanese border crossing officials had reported to work and informed the Team that they continue to patrol the area.

separation of arriving and departing passengers) and is performed by 38 officers from GS altogether (3 junior police officers, 35 police officers). Immigration checks are performed in conformity with the workflow as described in the introductory remarks. Passengers and vehicles then proceed to the customs clearance.

48. According to statistics received by GC, Arida clears an average of 88 trucks per day for import and 120 for export. A daily average of 1,137 cars and busses passes through in both directions. Concerning check of cargo, trucks carrying cargo are selected and sent to Tripoli for inspection. The Team was not able to learn the procedure or process for earmarking trucks for inspection. The Team was informed that there were not enough motor vehicles to conduct the relevant patrols and that officers often take taxis when returning from escorting trucks to Tripoli.

49. The premises of GS and GC are out of date and poorly furnished; the conditions in the small terminal for the customs clearance of vehicles and buses are satisfactory. GS and GC at this BCP are in general poorly equipped (e.g. lack of vehicles, radio equipment, scanner, cameras and explosive detectors). Customs operations are not computerised. Donated equipment from Germany for the detection of forgeries (Docu-Box and document examination toolkits) was present and working. All GS staff reportedly had passed further training courses in detection of forgeries conducted by the German Project Office in Beirut.

50. With regard to discovered criminal offences, the heads of GS and GC stated unanimously that only small scale smuggling (diesel, clothes and food) takes place at Arida. Smuggling of arms and ammunition allegedly has not been discovered since three years now (an incident of a small number of sidearms in an Iraqi truck was reported). Forgeries have not been discovered since an interviewed lieutenant from GS took up his post (1 year and seven months ago).

51. As it appears, no local co-operation between officials on both sides of the border takes place at Arida.

Aboudieh¹²

52. Aboudieh is the main BCP (classification "A") at the northern border with an average number of trucks crossing per day of 123 (entry) and 192 (exit) and an average of 1,015 cars and busses in both directions. The premises of Aboudieh are situated in a distance of approximately 1 km to the Border Line, with a village in between the Border Line and the perimeter of the BCP, and there is a narrow road immediately after leaving the Syrian border and a few meters before Lebanese customs advanced post. Therefore persons may deviate before approaching the Lebanese advance post. Near the border line, an advanced post manned by staff from Lebanese border authorities has been established for escorting Syrian buses and vehicles with passengers on a narrow road to the premises of the BCP, on a case by case basis in order to prevent passengers from keeping away from immigration check at the BCP (the village between the borderline and BCP being a risk factor). However, the stretch between the forward post and the premises of the BCP can be overlooked neither from the forward post nor from the premises of the BCP. Any deviation of passengers from the route is supposed to be detected by LAF; GS restricts its responsibility to the BCP.

53. The terminals for immigration check and customs clearance are situated in different locations. The BCP has no access gate, its perimeter as well as the way to the border line are not

¹² Similar situation as explained in note no 9

fenced. The premises of the BCP are also squeezed into a small location not being large enough for trucks and cargo, in particular when trucks are queuing as seen during the teams visit. Nevertheless, separate lanes for vehicles and trucks exist for arrival and departure as well.

54. The immigration check for arriving and departing passengers takes place in the same terminal (no separation of arriving and departing passengers) and is performed by 74 officers from GS altogether (1 junior police officer and 22 police officer per shift, 3 shifts).

55. There appears to be no visible control mechanism within the customs area, which is unfenced. Trucks are escorted to the border crossing point and selected trucks are sent to Tripoli to be inspected. Some passenger cars are checked, but predominantly cars with Lebanese licence plates are not subjected to inspection. There appears to be no standard procedures followed by all officers for the inspection of vehicles or passengers. Some report that they examine the cargo based on intuition.

56. The premises of GS and GC are also out of date and poorly furnished; the conditions in the small terminal for the customs clearance of vehicles and buses are satisfactory. GS and GC at this BCP are in general poorly equipped (e.g. lack of vehicles, radio equipment and equipment to assist the customs officials to conduct inspection of vehicles and cargo). Donated equipment from Germany for the detection of forgeries (Docu-Box and document examination toolkits) was present and working.

57. All GS staff reportedly has passed further training courses in detection of forgeries conducted by the German Project Office in Beirut. Immigration checks are performed in conformity with the workflow as described in the introductory remarks.

58. The only criminal offences as indicated by the heads of GS and GC related to small scale smuggling only (diesel, clothes, medicine and cellular phones). No local co-operation between officials on both sides of the border was reported to take place.

Bokayaa

59. The Bokayaa BCP is not yet operational but will become in July 2007 the third BCP on the northern border; it is located approximately 25 km east of the BCP El Aboudieh. The premises Bokayaa are situated at a distance of approximately 500 meters to the Border Line; the establishment of a forward post similar to Aboudieh is planned and a preliminary forward post already established. There were signs that villagers live and conduct business alongside the road that joins the border crossing point to the borderline. The municipality has been demolishing shops and houses along the unpaved road to the borderline that have kept busy (illegal) trans-border commerce going; during the Team's visit only some shops were remaining. The Lebanese authorities informed the Team that they are in the process of removing all the shops from alongside the roadway and erecting fencing along the length of this roadway that leads to the borderline. A narrow river that can be crossed easily in the summer when it is drained delineates this area of the borderline.

60. The terminals for immigration check and customs clearance will be situated at different localities inside the city. The premises of the BCP are squeezed into a narrow location probably not being large enough for trucks and cargo. The premises of GS (a previous post of the Syrian forces) have been refurbished but is neither furnished nor equipped. They are located at the centre of a seemingly busy thoroughfare where villagers move freely on foot and in vehicles and conduct

commercial activities. The perimeter is not yet fenced; an access gate does not exist either. Facilities to house the General Customs have not yet been provided. The entire outlay of the area designated for receiving cargo and passengers lack a level of control that would ensure that outgoing passengers and cargo remain separated and that the travellers do not interact with the villagers.

61. The team was informed that there is a plan underway to eventually move this border crossing to the actual borderline, which is currently the same area where the current customs advanced post is situated. Currently, the Lebanese authority are in dialogue with Syria to build a border crossing point adjacent to the area earmarked for this new border post. The Team observed no sign on the Syrian side to indicating that such activity is taking place.

Kaa

62. The Kaa BCP is one of two BCPs at the Eastern border to Syria and is located approximately 10 km southeast of the city of El Hermel. The premises of the BCP Kaa are situated at a distance of approximately 10 km to the Border Line with approximately 3,000 permanent inhabitants living in the zone. Near the border line a forward post manned with LAF staff is established for checking suspicious arriving and departing passengers/vehicles¹³. Kaa processes an average of 4 trucks per day for import, 8 for export, and the total of car and busses passing through in both directions averages 303 daily.

63. The perimeter of the BCP is partially surrounded by a wall; an access gate does not exist. Cross-border traffic arriving at the perimeter is not separated into lanes for vehicles, buses and trucks, resulting in inadequate control over the movement of passengers and their cargo within the customs area. The customs area is small and there are no facilities for body search and no hand held equipment for detecting concealments of prohibited items. The terrain however would be spacious enough to extend the infrastructure and the facilities for a satisfying organisation of incoming and outgoing traffic.

64. The premises and furniture of the GS at Kaa are in good condition. The immigration check for arriving and departing passengers takes place in the same terminal (no separation of arriving and departing passengers) and is performed by 8 officers per shift from GS (1 junior police officer and 7 police officers). There are no female officers at Kaa.

65. GS at this BCP is poorly equipped (e.g. lack of vehicles and radio equipment). Donated equipment from Germany for the detection of forgeries (Docu-Box and document examination toolkits) seen been operated. Eighty percent of GS staff reportedly passed further training courses in detection of forgeries conducted by the German Project Office in Beirut.

66. Immigration checks are performed in conformity with the workflow as described in the introductory remarks. With regard to customs inspection, there seems to be an absence of standard procedures based on unbiased reviewing and profiling of cars passengers and cargo. This border crossing point lacks a computer to link the customs operations to the main system in Beirut. With regard to discovered criminal offences, the interviewed shift leader of GS stated that one person had been caught by the LAF on 30 May 2007 attempting to illegally sneak into the country. Smuggling, in particular smuggling of arms and ammunition allegedly would not take place at Kaa.

¹³ Lebanese exit stamps of passengers staying for more than one day in the zone between the BCP and the BL (for smuggling activities or other purposes) cease to be valid.

67. Inter-agency cooperation between GS at the BCP and the LAF forward post does not take place, and neither is it the case with Customs. Cooperation and coordination requests have to be channelled through the Headquarters of the military intelligence. Criminal offenders apprehended by LAF along the border are handed over to GS at Kaa for further investigation. No local co-operation between officials on both sides of the border takes place.

Masnaa

68. The Masnaa BCP is the main BCP (classification "A") at the eastern border and is the most important BCP for cross-border traffic to Damascus/Syria. Trucks, passenger buses, taxis and private cars use this border crossing point to transport people and cargo across the border. Daily average of trucks for import amounts to 194 and 180 for export. A total average of 905 buses and cars pass daily in both directions. An advanced customs post is situated at this borderline and the customs brigade are responsible for ensuring that cargo and suspicious passengers are escorted to the official border crossing point. Lebanese officials estimate that approximately 3000 individuals are living in villages situated between the borderline and the official border crossing point.

69. The premises of Masnaa are situated at a distance of approximately 8 km to the Border Line. The perimeter of the BCP is partially enclosed by a wall and a fence. The cargo area where trucks are located is not fenced. There are no infrastructure and equipment for the inspection of cargo. The authorities have acknowledged that the current flow of traffic and the logistics of the compound are inadequate. The premises of the BCP are located within a small area. Therefore plans are underway to purchase neighbouring lands, which is hoped to alleviate the problem of space. Despite this initiative, the compound will be too small to accommodate the flow of traffic going through this border crossing point. At the moment, construction work for another bus lane is ongoing. Separate lanes for arrival and departure exist only for vehicles; arriving trucks have to cross the lane of vehicles/buses for arriving at the cargo checking area. The conditions in the premises of GS at Masnaa are apparently satisfactory. The immigration check for departing and arriving passengers take place in separate terminals.

70. The Customs system is not computerised and the Customs processes and procedures are manually linked to Beirut. Customs entries are regularly sent to the General Customs in Beirut, who enters the relevant statistics. The Team was informed that the automated system for customs data ++ (ASYCUNDA ++) will soon be implemented and linked to Beirut. Information on cars and the drivers that depart and arrive through the border crossing point are logged in a computerised system and there is no evidence to suggest that the information is being utilised for risk/trend analysis.

71. GS and GC at this BCP are in general poorly equipped (e.g. lack of vehicles, radio equipment and hand held devices for detecting explosives, weapons, or other concealed contraband and concealed compartments). Donated equipment from Germany for the detection of forgeries (Docu-Box and document examination toolkits) were present and working. The fixed scanner donated by the Chinese government is not yet in place.

72. All GS staff reportedly has passed further training courses in detection of forgeries conducted by the German Project Office in Beirut. The superficial level of inspection done by Customs officials indicates that, to a large extent, these Customs officers are unaware of common concealment methods and trends in weapons smuggling, precursor chemicals and raw materials for making explosives.

73. Due to infrastructural circumstances the immigration checks at Masnaa differ from the work flow as described in the introductory remarks as customs clearance takes place before immigration check.

74. With regard to detection of criminal offences, the head of GS stated that misuse and forging of ID cards being a common criminal offence detected at Masnaa.¹⁴

c) Partial assessment, analysis and conclusions

75. Arida is the only land BCP located close to the Border Line, and the other BCPs have remote premises supplemented by a forward post close to the Border Line. Despite these advanced posts, the authorities do not have strategic surveillance over the areas between the border crossing point and the borderline, which are often either inhabited or hilly and bushy terrain. These circumstances constitute risk factors for border security as they facilitate smuggling and illegal trafficking.

76. Most of the perimeters of the BCPs are located in small spaces preventing the implementation of efficient and effective processes concerning immigration checks and customs clearance (establishment of separated lanes for vehicles, busses and trucks, existence of separated arrival and departure terminals, separation of arriving and departing passengers, sufficient parking space for trucks/cargo). In general the perimeters of the BCPs do not have access gates and mostly are partially fenced or not at all. The zoning and separation of arriving and departing passengers within the premises are poorly defined and in some instances non-existent. The lack of defined areas for processing incoming and outgoing passengers and cargo results in an absence of a controlled sterile Customs area, which is an essential component of border security.

77. Immigration checks and customs clearance take place at three positions; the current workflow slows down the processing of passengers and is liable to present shortcomings in terms of border security. The procedures used to control arriving vehicles are inadequate, as there are no clear standards that are being used to ensure that cargo is selected for inspection based on adequate risk analysis. Neither does the selection of vehicles and passengers for inspection appear to be based on profiles garnered from proper risk analysis. Lack of such standards and the absence of risk analysis/profiling, serves to limit the ability of the customs officials to target potential smugglers and prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives or other dangerous items through the official crossing points. Immigration check is not fully computerized. Manual data insertion and registration (to be carried out in case of Lebanese or Syrian ID-card holders) is time consuming. Subsequent investigations are laborious and time-intensive.

78. Immigration checks and questioning of passengers are not based on risk-analysis and profiling but take place in a standardized process. The techniques used to inspect passenger vehicles and cargo trucks are not thorough and therefore the ingenious smuggler may find it quite easy to conceal not only explosives, light weapons and ammunition, but also assembled and unassembled heavy weaponry, such as missiles and rockets into the country concealed in compartments and panels of cargo trucks and passenger vehicles. Experience has proven that strategic selection and thorough inspection of cargo is essential in border security, because international trends indicate that contraband is often moved as part of normal cargo and may be transported using falsified

¹⁴ Note: On 7 June 2007 12 alleged Iraqi nationals were seized at Masnaa suspected using forged IDs.

information on key documents. The Contraband may successfully pass through the customs areas with or without knowledge or assistance from enforcement agents.

79. Additionally, smuggling of consumer items such as gasoline and clothing in itself is not a serious threat to the security of the country's borders. However, trends in other countries have indicated that seemingly 'innocent smuggling' at times is an indication of more dangerous organised crime such as the movement of weapons and drugs. Similarly, the same methods used to smuggle consumer items could also be used to smuggle weapons into Lebanon. Organised crime may be facilitated at two levels, the international level and the local level. External merchants operating internationally usually employ local entrepreneurs to facilitate the entry of contraband into the targeted country. Consequently, in the case of Lebanon, it is essential that special attention be given to the so-called innocent smuggling, which may be an indication of a more serious trend.

80. Guidelines for checking procedures in the form of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) do not exist. The workflow and the procedures keep to well-trodden paths even if gaps are obvious. Inter-agency cooperation and international co-operation (local co-operation between officials on both sides of the border) exists only in the beginnings if at all.

81. Premises are in general poorly furnished and staff insufficiently equipped; infrastructure circumstances at the BCPs are badly in need of improvement. The cramped conditions of the current locations of most of the BCPs create negative effects on immigration checks and customs clearance, e.g. the existence of one terminal only for arriving and departing cross-border traffic and the inefficient processing of passengers/vehicles (queuing of following vehicles while one is processed). In case of relocation of BCP premises closer to the Border Line the existing deficiencies should be remedied.

Recommendations

82. The BCPs with remote premises should be relocated close to the Border Line in order to avoid risk factors for the immigration check and the customs clearance, e.g. the situation at the BCP El Aboudieh where a village is situated between the Border Line and the premises of the BCP thus making it possible for passengers to keep away from the immigration check or to hide contraband.

83. The current method used to process passengers and vehicles (3 stops within the perimeter of a BCP) slows down the process and is not in line with the concept of integrated border management. The implementation of a single-stop process with separate checking positions for vehicles apart from the queue could speed up the process considerably and promote inter-agency cooperation.

84. Further expansion of computerized immigration checks would simplify and speed up as well the work of the staff of GS at BCPs. Subsequent investigations could then be carried out technically and would be less error-prone. In times of continuously increasing passenger traffic the intensity of passenger questioning should be subject to periodical risk analysis. Dedicated resources should be concentrated on cross-border traffic, making it the focus of attention, especially in relation with the infiltration of terrorists into the country. The initiation of guidelines for checking staff in the form of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) could set up quality standards for immigration checks and minimize human errors.

85. International donors have been donating various equipments for GS and GC, including Germany which is also currently implementing a pilot project at the northern border providing

capacity building elements. The international sub donor group “border management” coordinates further engagement of the international community in the field of border security. Further capacity building (training and funding of equipment) is needed to enhance the capability of personnel and the technical level of border security.

86. Inter-agency and international co-operation are key elements of an integrated border management and should be either established or expanded where it already exists at a low level.

Beirut Airport

Overview

87. Beirut Airport is the only international and civilian airport in Lebanon. The premises were inaugurated in 1996 and served in 2005 a volume of 3,285,076 passengers¹⁵.

88. All four border security agencies are involved in airport security. General Security is responsible for migration control of passengers. General Customs deal with the clearance of cargo. General law enforcement within the airport premises is entrusted to General Security and external security responsibilities lies with LAF. Airport Security is responsible for the overall security and acts as the coordinating body. In all airport security related issues, the four security agencies refer to the Head of Airport Security

89. Arriving passengers are first checked at the passport control, where a comparison check between passport and passenger is performed; the authenticity of the passport is checked manually. A document verifier is present in each passport booth for further examination of the passport. The verifier is normally switched off and is only switched on if the passport officer becomes suspicious. The only person that can switch on the equipment is the supervisor, who will have to be called to the passport booth. After examination of the passport, the equipment is switched off again. Before leaving the passport control area, a second line of control ensures that the passenger has gone through passport control procedures by checking the presence of an entry stamp in the passport.

90. The passenger then proceeds to customs formalities. Customs in the airport has adopted international standards for checking incoming passengers, passing through a dual channel system (green or red) in order to facilitate rapid luggage clearance and travellers’ flow.

91. Outgoing passengers will pass 3 lines of control. The first line includes a passport/passenger relation and flight ticket check and luggage security screening. After that the passenger proceeds to check in. After check in, the passenger will pass a passport pre-check before entering the passport control area itself. At the passport control, comparison check between passport and passenger is performed; the authenticity of the passport is checked manually. At both the pre-check and the passport control, passport verifiers are present. Before boarding the plane, a final passport/boarding card/passenger comparison check is performed.

92. At the cargo terminal, customs are using two scanners for the clearance of commercial cargo, complemented by manual search. There is no physical separation between the incoming and outgoing cargo.

¹⁵ 2006 figures are not representative, due to the conflict situation at that time.

Facts and findings

93. The security system for airside access appears to be in consistent with international standards. The procedures for passport control and customs clearance for passengers are well suited and implemented. The staff in the passport control points displayed good knowledge of passport control and of the document examination equipment. The procedure that necessitates a supervisor to switch on the verifiers before any use does not appear to be optimum. It induces a possible reluctance with the passport control officers, as it is time consuming and breaks the passenger flow for unnecessary long periods of time. The staff performing security screening of passengers and luggage is seen to perform satisfactory and following rules.

94. As the customs has not had a single case of weapons smuggling since 1996, it lacks the experience and data to be used for risk assessment and target setting. The manual control of commercial cargo used as a supplement to the two rather obsolete scanners was not sufficient due to lack of training.

95. Between the areas for incoming and outgoing cargo, there was no physical separation, but the corridor linking the two areas was surveyed manually by an officer in a office adjacent to the corridor. This appears insufficient, as the officer had other tasks inside the office as well. The cargo area is placed airside, but vehicles entering and leaving the area appeared to be searched manually on a random basis only.

96. A possible interception of incoming cargo before the release screening and manual transfer to a vehicle at the outgoing cargo area appears to be possible with relative ease, thus creating an opportunity to avoid security control and taxation. An airside access system, including progressive security restricted areas, has been introduced with manual check between the different areas. In addition ISF performs random checks and patrols in all areas.

97. There is an adequate presence of female staff in the airport for manual security checks of female passengers; a few female officers in GC and 27 in GS are supporting each other. The Airport does not posses advanced passport examination equipment or dedicated document experts. Detection equipment is lacking (sniffer dogs, scanners etc.).

Conclusion and recommendations

98. There is a need for improvement of certain procedures. For example, the necessity to call a supervisor in order to perform a basic technical passport examination should be revisited. An effective and physical separation of in- and outgoing cargo is essential to ensure that taxation and more important security screening cannot be avoided. A boost in equipment concerning more advanced passport examination and cargo security screening equipment with an emphasis on detection of weapons and explosives is needed.

Beirut Seaport

Overview

99. Beirut seaport is the main port in Lebanon with a volume of 20,831 passengers and 1,829 merchant ships per year (statistics 2006). The 2005 figures were of 29,657 and 2,289 respectively. The Beirut Port has several security systems and agencies and processes in place to ensure that contraband does not enter into the country from the port facilities. The following border authorities are present at Beirut seaport: GS, GC and LAF. In addition, a private company, the Ports Authority, is also in charge of the security inside the perimeter of the ports¹⁶.

Facts and Findings

100. Currently, there is no restricted access for visitors to the port and incoming and outgoing cargo are not zoned. In addition, the parking lot is situated inside the port premises. During the visit to the ports, the team observed that construction work was ongoing to build fences so as to create physical restriction between the various areas of the ports, thus enhancing the security in the seaport. At the same time new ID-cards with security features are supposed to be introduced. Moreover a video surveillance project has started on 12 June 2007 in order to track movements within the seaport thus improving security in the seaport as well. Access to the seaport requires the issuance of an either temporary or permanent access card.

101. The terminals/facilities for immigration check and customs clearance are situated at different locations inside the perimeter of the port. The immigration check for arriving and departing crewmembers and passengers takes place in the same terminal. The premises of GS are apparently in good condition and the available furniture satisfactory. The main radar that was lost in the bombings in July 2006 still has not been replaced.

102. The equipment donated by Germany for the detection of forgeries (Docu-Box and document examination toolkits) was present and working. Sniffer dogs for searching explosives are available upon request. All GS staff has allegedly passed through further training courses in detection of forgeries conducted by the German Project Office in Beirut. Four officers of GS have participated in another further training course in detection of forgeries in China.

103. Immigration checks of crewmembers are performed as follows: GS collects crewmembers passports on board and performs immigration checks in the terminal. GS keeps the passports during the ships' stay in the port. GS checks ships riding at anchor in the port randomly in order to detect stowaways. Based on a risk analysis two officers from GS are continuously present on board "risk ships" in order to check entry and exit of crew members.

104. Inter-agency cooperation is not sufficiently developed. For example, GC and LAF perform both container checks at different locations within the perimeter of the port. Manning the GC facilities (X-Ray hall and operation container) with soldiers from the LAF would permit better synergies.

105. The General Customs and the Lebanon Armed Forces are the key agents responsible for the inspection of cargo at the Beirut seaport. The customs officials informed the Team that risk analysis

¹⁶ A wall encloses the perimeter of the seaport; five gates in all allow access to the port facilities. GS and LAF are in charge for access control at these gates. As it seems there is an overlapping responsibility between these two agencies with regard to the access control that is performed by both agencies.

is utilised to earmark cargo for inspection. The LAF inspects all cargo leaving the port whether it had been previously examined by customs or not. The Lebanese Armed Forces manually inspects cargo without assistance of search aids such as hand held devices or dogs. One fixed scanner is in place and the customs officer controlling the machine appears capable and comfortable using it. Customs does not board ships that are docked at the ports. The Customs authorities informed the Team that there have been no official reports of seizure of weapons or ammunition at the seaport. With regard to discovered criminal offences the heads of GS and GC stated unanimously that only smuggling of goods (fake of all kinds of goods, i.e. clothes, watches, cosmetics and so on) takes place at Beirut seaport.

106. The Ports Authority is a private sector company that also plays an essential role in enhancing the security of the port and cargo. This company is responsible for recording, managing and monitoring the movement of cargo on the ports, which includes ensuring the integrity of the seal that are placed on the containers at the port of departure and also whilst on the port. The Ports Authority is also responsible for upholding the standards of the International Ship and Port Facility Security code (ISPS). The ISPS is an international standard that is intended as a measure to counter the threat to maritime security from terrorism. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is implementing this code worldwide.

Conclusions and recommendations

107. The Beirut seaport has several procedures and practices in place that are essential for the security of cargo and the prevention of smuggling. The General Customs has implemented risk management systems that assist in the identification of high-risk cargo. The fixed scanner is also a very good addition and should usefully bolster the security of Lebanon's border. The LAF creates an essential check and balance by re-inspecting cargo that has already been inspected. However, the team believes that it is not essential for the LAF to conduct a 100% re-inspection. The LAF should base its inspections on risk analysis and intelligence. The presence of the Ports Authority is a good practice and should be supported and encouraged because the Ports Authority staff is the first point of contact with cargo that enters the country.

108. In order to exercise full control over all cargo, whether on the port or aboard ships, it is advisable that General Customs boards ships based on intelligence and risk assessment. This will help to deter any port side or transfer of weapons within the maritime territory of the country.

B. GREEN BORDER

a) Description and processes

109. The Green Border included in this assessment is the land border between Lebanon and Syria, stretching from the coastal Border Crossing Point at Arida in the Northwest corner of Lebanon to Mount Hermon in the Southeast, where it reaches the area of responsibility of UNIFIL. The Green Border covers a distance of approximately 320 kilometres. The terrain is extremely diversified along the Green border and offers very different possibilities and difficulties for both border security and illegal cross border activities.

110. From the coast stretching 40 kilometres to the East, the border terrain is mainly fertile flat lowland with fields, vegetation and small forests with private houses, farms and industry located

very near the river that marks the border. Further to the east the border terrain changes to flat highland (up to approximately 400 meters) with ravines leading down to the border river. From the NE corner of Lebanon, the border turns southeast into a hilly highland terrain alternating with areas of flat terrain. At BCP Kaa the border turns south climbing into the mountain ridge of Anti-Lebanon.

111. The Anti-Lebanon marks the eastern border of Lebanon to Syria all the way down to Mount Hermon reaching the UNIFIL area of responsibility. The Anti-Lebanon consists of in part very hilly terrain with many valleys and rugged mountain areas reaching a height of more than 2,500 meters. All along the border there are countless tracks crossing the border through low or dried out riverbeds in the north and mountain roads or tracks in the hilly and mountains areas to the east, to a large extent passable using 4x4 vehicles.

112. There is a very high level of cross border activities that lies in a grey-zone. Although technically illegal, a large amount of people have daily “social” reasons to cross the border. Many people own and cultivate land on the other side of the border, there are very strong family-ties across the border, many children attend schools and many seek medical help on the other side of the border. In addition, a large number of families are relying on petty smuggling activities as their only source of income or as the only way to uphold a livelihood.

Responsibility of Green Border Security Management

113. The Green Border security management between the BCPs is the overall responsibility of the LAF that deployed approximately 8,600 personnel along the Green Border after resolution 1701 was adopted. The deployed units of LAF at the border have been given the dual task of both securing the Green Border and of defending the territory of Lebanon. As reinforcement in general or as replacement of LAF troops being redeployed elsewhere in Lebanon ISF units are deployed at the Green Border. During the LIBAT’s stay in Lebanon, more than 1,000 LAF personnel were redeployed away from the border due to the fighting in Nahr Al-Bared north of Tripoli, the bombings in Beirut and other tasks.

114. LAF is supported by Customs Brigades, which is a uniformed and executive part of General Customs, who carry out mobile patrols in the near-border areas.

Equipment availability

115. LAF and the Customs Brigades are performing their duties concerning border security with equipment that is inadequate in numbers or not suited for the task. In the units of the LAF deployed along the Green Border and Customs Brigade, there is a lack of border-specific equipment. LAF patrols and “ambushes” are to a large extent carried out with the use of trucks and APCs, in part due to the military wish for strength in numbers but also in part due to the lack of suitable 4x4 vehicles. Surveillance equipment such as binoculars is inadequate in numbers for both agencies. The presence of night vision equipment is very scarce, most observation posts and patrols are without this equipment at all. Even observation posts in areas around Palestinian cross border strongholds make do with simple light enhancement equipment without magnification, limiting the range of use to a maximum of 400 metres. Equipment for performing improvised long-duration observation in difficult terrain and tough weather conditions is non-existent.

Concept of Green Border security management

116. Securing the border is in general based on a three-line philosophy. First line is fixed observation posts and strongholds surveying the borderline itself. Second line is patrol activities carried out either by mechanized or foot patrols, supplemented by ambush activities, which are typically executed by one or two platoons with light vehicles, trucks and Armoured Personal Carriers (APCs) using traditional military techniques. Third line is checkpoints along major roads, typically in fixed positions and in some instances reinforced by APCs. Third line checkpoints may be manned by either LAF, GC or ISF, only on very rare occasions as joint operations.

Coordination and cooperation

117. Very little coordination or cooperation takes place on the Green border. The agencies involved, primarily LAF, GC and ISF, are working each within their own field of responsibility. Only if a situation makes it necessary, for instance where a person illegally crosses the border or where contraband is found, will the case be handed over to GS or GC respectively. There is none or very little cooperation or joint operations between the agencies, in particular on the operational level. Barely any joint activity has been observed or identified, in particular in the shape of forward planning. As an example, the Customs Brigade is performing its own operations, based on their own information, only informing the LAF on on-going operations through the Central Operational Unit of the Customs Directorate.

118. The information and intelligence sharing is based on each agency's assessment of whether it might fall into the field of responsibility of another. If so, it is handed over, but there appears to be no joint assessment of gathered intelligence. Any information to be forwarded between agencies will pass from one agency through the chain of command to that agency's Headquarters, from there to the other agency's Headquarters and then ideally forwarded to the appropriate level. The information and intelligence flow is therefore almost exclusively vertical; and much centralised.

Border Security Management results

119. Some results were documented with regard to apprehending illegal border crossers (returning from Syria or Iraqi asylum seekers), showing the existence or a capability to do so. In terms of seizing goods illegally crossing the border some results have been documented. To a large extent, these seizures are the result of information received from citizens motivated by a substantial financial reward based on the amount of the fine to be paid by the smuggler.

120. However, all seizures concern traditional smuggling goods such as diesel, clothes, cement, food etc. No seizure involved weapons or explosives. Although a few cases of seizing illegal weapons have taken place, according to the Border Security agencies none of the cases happened in direct connection with a border crossing activity and none of them so far has been documented to be en route from across the Syrian border. In all cases known to LIBAT, the claim has been that they were internal weapons transports between different locations inside Lebanon.

121. Several problems faced by the agencies responsible for border security on the Green Border: lack of resources; inadequate equipment in terms of quantity and quality; very little long term experience in the field of border security; and concept weaknesses. However, and even taking these problems into account, the performance of the agencies in stopping ongoing arms smuggling, which is generally accepted as a fact, can only be described as not up to what could be expected.

122. Even given the difficult conditions under which the agencies have to perform their duties, one would have expected that an occasional seizure of arms, either in the process of being smuggled from the border or on its way after such an activity, would have taken place. If by nothing else, then by pure chance. This lack of performance is worrying. It may be indicative of unsatisfactory performance by the agencies entrusted with border security. It must also raise questions on the issue of the integrity of the agencies and its personnel involved in border security. LIBAT is not in a position to document the true reason for the lack of performance, but it has been put to the team from very different levels in the agencies, that illegal decisions on border management do take place, motivated by political sympathies, family/clan connections or traditional corruption.

b) Facts and findings on locations I to XI¹⁷

123. The following locations and areas were visited during the team's stay in Lebanon:

- I. Borderland adjacent to Nahr el Kabir river from El Aarida and 4,5 kilometres to the east
- II. Zone between Aboudieh BCP facilities and the physical border at Nahr el Kabir river
- III. Borderland adjacent to river (physical border) from the eastern part of Sahlet el Bqaiiaa pocket and 5 km to the southeast at Wadi Khaled river
- IV. Location where road is leading to border 1 km east of El Qasr town
- V. Location where the road is leading to border at Haouch Beit Ismail town
- VI. Zone (Ard el Qamar) between Kaa BC facilities and the physical border
- VII. Lebanese area east of Anti Lebanon mountain ridge (Jabal Lubnan Al Sharqi)
- VIII. Location of Palestinian cross-border stronghold east of Qoussaya town
- IX. Location of disputed territory around Deir el Aachayer town
- X. Location of Palestinian cross-border stronghold at Haloua
- XI. Borderline and borderland from BCP ARIDA to Rayak – airborne study assessment

I. Borderland adjacent to Nahr el Kabir river from El Aarida and 4,5 kilometres to the East

124. The area is primarily agricultural and lies next to the river. Many private houses, farms and some industry buildings lie by or very close to the river. The same was seen on the Syrian side. The separating river is approx 1 – 2 meters deep and 2 – 6 meters wide. There is tense vegetation in some areas along its banks. The location offers good conditions for floating illegal persons or goods across the border. Due to its curved run, it is difficult to overlook the river for any substantial length from any one observation post. Parts of the river were not under surveillance.

125. A number of very visible light to medium fortified LAF observation posts were observed along the river as a first line of control. In the hinterland a few fixed LAF checkpoints were found as a third control line on major roads and junctions in the hinterland. The location of observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defense view rather than from a border security view.

¹⁷ roman digits refer to location on the map in annex 2

II. Zone between Aboudieh BCP facilities and the physical border at Nahr el Kabir river

126. The area is primarily agricultural or with bushes and trees and lies on both sides of a paved road leading the approximately 700 meters from the village of Abboudiye where the BCP facilities are located and the bridge crossing the river that marks the physical border. The road cannot be overlooked in its entirety from neither the forward Customs post at the bridge nor from the BCP facilities. None of them are tasked to perform this surveillance.

127. According to LAF the road is according to LAF being patrolled on a random basis as the first line of control. The zone is cordoned off by LAF observation posts and mobile patrols as a second line of control. At the time of the Team's visit, no patrols or observation posts were seen either inside the zone or visible from inside the zone. The LAF explained that there were no border crossings as the Syrians had closed the borders due to the fighting in the Palestinian camp north of Tripoli.

128. The zone offers advantageous conditions for persons to cross the river illegally into Lebanon and disappear in the bush land along the road, and for goods to be unloaded in the village before reaching the BCP facilities.

III. Borderland adjacent to river (physical border) from the eastern part of Sahlet el Bqaiiaa pocket and 5 km to the southeast at Wadi Khaled river

129. The area is in part cultivated and lies next to the river. A few private houses are located close to the river, but most on a ridge 500 – 1000 meters from the river. The separating river was to a large extent dried out at our time of visit, but in winter and spring it is approx 1 – 2 meters deep and 2 – 12 meters wide. There is some areas of dense vegetation along its bank. In several locations roads from both Lebanese and Syrian side were leading to the river (riverbed).

130. A number of very visible light to medium fortified LAF observation posts were observed along the river primarily on the ridge overlooking some parts of the river and the Syrian side. Due to its curved run and vegetation, it is difficult to overlook the river for any substantial length from any one observation post. The location of observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defence perspective rather than from a border security one.

131. The location offers good conditions for the illegal crossing of persons or goods across the border. Although the riverbed had either natural or manmade riverbanks of 0,5 to 1 meters height, unloading and reloading could be done without great difficulty, a practice according to LAF very often undertaken before their deployment. It was stated among onlookers that it still occurred. A number of children and teenagers were seen crossing the dried out border river several times unimpeded.

IV. Location where road is leading to border 1 km east of El Qasr town

132. A small village is encircled by a creek marking the border with Syria and forming a pocket into Syrian territory. The creek is in most places 0,5 to 1 meter wide and 10 – 40 cm deep. The only legal access to the village from the Lebanese side is through a LAF permanent checkpoint at small bridge. Inside the village an abnormal amount of goods was observed, in particular cement. The village appeared to be a staging ground for smuggling activities.

133. There were no LAF posts in the village, thus allowing relatively unhindered access to the village from Syrian side. Some Syrian military posts were seen very close to the creek at a point where a track was crossing from both sides. The track was obviously being used frequently. A few LAF observation posts were seen in the hinterland as second line of control. The location of observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defense perspective rather than from a border security one.

V. Location where road is leading to border at Haouch Beit Ismail town

134. A road located in flatlands leads to the border, but is blocked by sand walls. An LAF checkpoint is located there. The checkpoint was fortified with sandbags. A few observation posts were observed and appeared to be adequate for surveillance of the area. All posts were visible and lightly fortified.

VI. Zone (Ard el Qamar) between Kaa BC facilities and the physical border

135. The zone is defined by hills to the southeast, the river Assi to the northwest, the border river to the northeast and the El Kaa/El Hermel road to the southwest. The area is primarily used for sheep herding and agriculture and lies on both sides of a paved road leading the approximately 11 kilometres from the BCP facilities at El Kaa to the bridge crossing the river that marks the physical border. Inside the zone there are approximately 3,000 permanent residents with an additional 2,000 seasonal agriculture workers.

136. The zone is patrolled randomly by LAF units, either mechanized or on foot as a first line of control. The zone is cordoned off by LAF observation posts and mobile patrols as a second line of control. Inside the zone a 16-man strong LAF foot patrol was observed, very visible and moving in typical military combat formation. A few LAF observation posts were seen in the hinterland as second line of control. The location of observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defense perspective in part claiming the high ground superiority rather than from a border security one. The zone created by the location of the BCP facilities in Kaa 11 kilometres from the physical border leaves an area suitable as staging ground or holding area for illegal border crossers

VII. Lebanese area east of Anti Lebanon mountain ridge (Jabal Lubnan Al Sharqi)

137. The area of the village of Tfail forms a pocket into Syrian territory, only accessible from the Lebanese side by 4x4 vehicles, but easily accessible from Syria by normal roads. The gravel road leading to the eastern side of the mountain ridge reaching more than 1500 meters in height descends down to a relatively flat highland. The mountainous part of the pocket is used solely for sheep herding, whilst the flat land is primarily used for fruit production and agriculture.

138. The area is largely uncontrolled by LAF but for a very small number of random patrols. A first line of control does not exist. All traffic of vehicles and persons, supplies and commerce flows unhindered and uncontrolled by Lebanese authorities to and from Syria. The area is cordoned off by observation posts located in the mountains as a second line of control and checkpoints at major roads leading to the mountains from the Lebanese side as the third line.

139. On our way to the pocket using one road the checkpoint was observed on the northern outskirts of the village of Ham. The checkpoint was permanent, lightly fortified and reinforced by an

APC. Whilst crossing the ridge we observed two fixed LAF observation posts, overlooking the road. On the way back using another road, no LAF observation posts were observed. An LAF combined checkpoint/encampment was the first LAF presence observed using that particular road but located in the village of Ham at the foot of the mountains.

140. The use of this road for illegal cross border activities seems to be confirmed by the fact that on the way back from the pocket, the team observed one vehicle loaded with fuel barrels abandoned and stuck beside the road, one vehicle leaving the road into a group of trees when approaching and a third vehicle, that was checked by our ISF escort, en route into the pocket with dozens of empty jerry cans.

141. No mobile patrols were seen during our five hour presence inside the pocket. The almost completely uncontrolled pocket presents good conditions for providing a staging ground and storage area for illegal cross border activities, in particular because the Palestinian military cross border stronghold near Maaraboun is neighbouring the pocket. The location of (the few) observation posts and check points would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defense perspective rather than from a border security one.

VIII. Location of Palestinian cross-border stronghold east of Qoussaya town

142. The Palestinian stronghold is located around the mountain ridge of Er Rouss overlooking the Bekaa Valley. The Palestinian area extends from Lebanese territory into Syria, with the official borderline running through the area. There is no Lebanese authority presence in the Palestinian controlled area, leaving the borderline itself uncontrolled and to some extent outside the vision of the LAF. The LIBAT did not have access to the Palestinian controlled area. The completely uncontrolled area creates very good conditions for illegal and unhindered cross border activities recently documented by information received by LIBAT from the Lebanese Government. (The information is identical to that reported to the Security Council by the Special Envoy for the Implementation of SCR 1559 (2004))

143. The Palestinian area itself is cordoned off by LAF checkpoints and observation posts. The location of checkpoints and observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defence perspective rather than from a border security one, being very visible, heavily fortified with APCs.

IX. Location of disputed territory around Deir el Achayer town

144. The disputed territory consists of Syrian claimed pocket that reaches approximately 10 kilometres into Lebanon with a width of 2 – 4 kilometres and includes the high grounds southeast of the Damascus Highway. The pocket is presently under complete Syrian control and is de facto attached to Syria.

145. The LAF has adapted to the present situation by creating an encircling control line with heavily fortified positions including APCs and tanks. The location of observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defence perspective rather than from a border security one, being very visible and deterrent in nature.

X. Location of Palestinian cross-border stronghold at Haloua

146. The Palestinian stronghold adjacent to the disputed area under IX is located in the valley leading from Haloua to the Damascus Highway and the surrounding high ground. It extends from Lebanese territory North-East into Syria proper with the official borderline running through the area and touches the disputed area IX to the South-East.

147. There is no Lebanese authority presence in the Palestinian controlled area, leaving the borderline itself uncontrolled and to some extent outside the vision of the LAF. The area is cordoned off by LAF checkpoints and observation posts. The location of checkpoints and observation posts would appear to be chosen more from a territorial defense perspective rather than from a border security one, being very visible, heavily fortified with APCs and tanks. LIBAT could not attain access to the Palestinian controlled area.

148. The completely uncontrolled area creates very good conditions for illegal and unhindered cross border activities.

XI. Borderline and borderland from BCP ARIDA to Rayak – airborne assesment

149. In order to comprehend fully the nature of the differing terrain an airborne assessment was performed by helicopter, provided by Lebanese Air Force. The tour followed the northern border from BCP Arida eastwards to the BCP at Bokayaa, turning southeast following the borderline to Kaa. From there, the Team flew southwest following the western slopes of the Anti Lebanon mountains until Baalbek. South of Baalbek the flight kept some distance to the borderline, avoiding the Palestinian military strongholds at Maaraboun and Qussaya.

150. In general the bird's eye view confirmed the Team's observations on the ground particularly concerning the difficulties for border control. It also confirmed very clearly that the very diverse terrain offers many possible access ways for illegal cross border activities. A large number of cross-border trails that could be used by 4x4 vehicles were seen. The many valleys, dried out riverbeds, mountain trails etc. provide a large number of opportunities for illegal activity that cannot be countered by static observation posts along the border or in the border-near areas.

151. At the same time, it also revealed the strength of airborne border surveillance, as both the helicopter crew and the LIBAT frequently identified either suitable locations or options for illegal activities, which would be very difficult to realize from the ground. A number of suspicious vehicles and activities were spotted that would have called for interception, had the flight been a border security patrol. We even observed permanent installations (pipes) for the smuggling of fuel crossing the border downhill to Lebanese lowland.

c) Partial assessment, analysis, conclusions

152. The lack of operational cooperation and coordination is evident. Combining the capabilities of several agencies does not appear to be a desired option. All agencies appear very self-contained and do not actively seek joint operations or planning. This means that any chance for synergy effect is lost. In particular the lack of joint operations based on joint planning presents a multitude of lost opportunities. A system that ensures usage of the collective capabilities of the agencies for operational purposes is needed.

153. There is a lack of joint intelligence gathering and analysis in order to inter alia identify profitable targets for operations based on the total sum of intelligence and info from all involved

agencies. Military intelligence seems to have established itself as the leading intelligence component, occasionally feeding info to the other agencies but it is still reliant on its own intelligence plus what other intelligence components choose to convey to it. There is a definite need to establish a common intelligence and analysis unit to ensure that information and intelligence is not lost or stored wrongly.

154. It is evident that the LAF is lacking personnel resources, forcing it to prioritize border defence over border security. It is in particular evident that the majority of the personnel are used for static defense positions and not for fast and flexible mobile patrols focusing on illegal border activities. With the multitude of tasks given to the LAF, it is clearly overstretched in particular at times when active fighting or enhanced security threats are constraining the actions of the LAF.

155. The Customs Brigades are suffering from being understaffed. The requested strength for the Customs Brigades is at 2635 but the actual strength is only at 1,320. This discrepancy obviously limits the units' capability to perform operations.

156. The task of securing the Green Border is new to the LAF and does not fall inside what is normally considered to be a military task. LAF has problems adapting the known military doctrines to its new task as being responsible for the prevention of illegal cross border activities on the Green Border. Although LAF appears to do its best under the given conditions and the personnel seems both vigilant and observant, the result is still the deployment of personnel best suited for traditional combat situations. The lack of resources probably also plays its role.

157. The result is that LAF is in reality facing a civilian problem with military doctrines, at the same time sending the signal to both population and own personnel, that the main priority is defense of the territory rather than preventing (in particular) arms smuggling. Although this priority might be understandable, it also impedes both the LAF and also other border security agencies from keeping focus on smuggling. A change of concept / mind set from military doctrine to civilian border control is needed in order to ensure high efficiency in the latter.

158. The many legal and semi-legal border-near and cross-border activities in combination with the "accepted" smuggling blurs and fogs the picture of the border, making it difficult to distinguish the serious illegal cross border activities like commercial smuggling and arms smuggling from the rest. There is a need to separate the legal, semi-legal and accepted smuggling from more serious border crimes, making the latter a more visible and recognizable target.

159. The dilemma of petty smugglers losing their income and families their livelihood if border security is tightened must be solved through socio-economic projects. Without such projects, the elimination or reduction of that particular traffic will continue blurring the picture of cross border activities, in particular because the border security agencies' present tendency to close their eyes on these particular activities will most likely continue. Consequently, failure to solve or reduce this socio-economical dilemma will preserve an obstacle to effective border security.

160. All agencies involved in Green Border security are suffering from insufficient equipment. Lack of suitable equipment reduces the possibility to perform border surveillance adequately both in terms of quantity and quality. There is a need to both ensure that these agencies become better equipped, but also to ensure that the equipment is border security relevant. Equipment needed is in particular surveillance equipment suitable for night observations and operations, 4x4 vehicles to ensure a higher level of mobility and less visible patrolling. Reliable communications systems will

enable small and light unit patrols to be undertaken without having to rely heavily on strength in numbers.

161. The lack of cross border cooperation is evident. There is no cooperation between the Lebanese agencies on the operational level and their Syrian counterparts. As optimum border security management can only be reached by cooperation of the border agencies on both side of the border, its absence clearly represents an obstacle to improvement of the border security.

162. The lack of results shown in the field of arms smuggling even taking into consideration the difficult conditions under which the agencies have to perform is troubling. It raises the question of whether the current and planned capacity building efforts will give the desired effect. What ever the reason or reasons might be, it shows that there is a need for a solution that will dramatically increase the risk of detection through ensuring the integrity of the enforcing agencies.

163. The conclusion must be that at the moment, there is no real alternative to the existing model of four agencies responsible for border security along the Green Border. The ongoing efforts should therefore build on that model and be continued both in capacity building and technical reinforcement concerning these agencies.

164. On the other hand, the existing model is a heavy ship for a change of course, and for a faster improvement alternative solutions should be looked into. A solution might be establishing a multi-agency mobile task force that will be working in parallel to the existing model but with an enhanced focus on arms smuggling. The task would be within a relative short period of time, to commence targeted operations based on the analysis and target-identifying analysis of an embedded joint intelligence and analysis cell. It would combine the best capabilities of the four existing agencies reinforced by a small team of international border security advisors.

165. The personnel in the unit would be required to have sufficient knowledge on all aspects of border security including documents control, customs procedures, tactical techniques etc. The unit should be highly skilled and suitable equipped for special operations. It should have a high level of mobility, including airlift capacity and 4x4 vehicles. A high degree of independence and integrity should be ensured through appropriate command and control mechanisms. The joint intelligence and analysis cell should provide information to all of the four existing agencies. A small, highly efficient unit would increase the risk of detection for arms smugglers and thus create a deterring effect on arms smugglers in general. Furthermore, if in the future a political decision would be made for creating a dedicated Border Guard Agency, the multi-agency unit could provide a solid foundation for this.

166. A number of measures must be undertaken in order to separate legal and illegal border or near-border activities. The current mixing of all sorts of traffic near and on the border makes the task of identifying illegal activities very difficult. In order to reduce the personnel-consuming border surveillance task for LAF and at the same time increase border surveillance efficiency, a boost in border security dedicated hi-tech equipment, including air surveillance capability (helicopter, UAV) would serve as compensation.

C. Conclusions

167. Border Security at the Syrian border is a new exercise for all the security agencies, based on the recent history of Lebanon. The Lebanese security agencies have taken substantial measure to secure this section of its border against arms smuggling, mostly based on the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area. Security agencies demonstrate a good level of understanding of the nature of their duties in relation to the provision of resolution 1701 (2006). Despite such measures, the current border control strategy, the nature of the terrain, the current state of equipment available and training, as well as the processes and infrastructures at the official Border Crossing Points make it still possible for arms to be smuggled undetected through the border line. LIBAT would however like to point out that even in an unfavorable environment, and using the assets and equipment currently available, it would be reasonable to expect more efficiency in finding cross-border weapons smuggling. Beirut Airport and foremost Beirut Sea port benefit from a better level of control in the processing of passengers and cargo.

168. The presence of armed Palestinian camps in the border zone constitutes a major obstacle to the notion of border security and to the implementation of an efficient concept of integrated border security. In addition, the incomplete delineation of the border with Syria present further difficulties to efficient border control and does not motivate the border security agencies to intervene in those areas which are not clearly demarked. In this regard, a political agreement is urgently needed. The presence of such negative factors to border security on the Green border should however not overshadow the current ease to conceal weaponry and related materiel hidden inside the legitimate cargo of trucks passing undetected through the main land border crossing points.

169. While border security agencies have started to cooperate for the control of the border, their understanding of cooperation limits itself for the moment to mostly indirect exchange of information and separation of the areas of responsibility and operation, still far from implementing basic aspects of integrated border management. The bulk of the substance of the recommendation presented in section V by LIBAT relates to means to ensure in the short term increasing levels of integration and efficiency amongst the existing forces, and aiming in a longer term to the creation of a specialized border control agency. Such an increased grasp on all aspects of border security will have to be accompanied by socio-economic programmes aimed at providing an alternative income for the families dependent on the revenue of petty smuggling.

D. Assessment on the implementation of the DPKO reports' recommendations

170. During the activities of LIBAT the findings of the DPKO/Police Division assessment reports of September 2006 and March 2007 has been analyzed and its recommendations has been incorporated in this report where appropriate. However, to an extent not insignificant the LIBAT has found that the findings, conclusions and recommendations are in part or in their entirety still valid.

Concepts and procedures

171. The concept of Integrated Border Management has not seen much progress. The four agencies responsible for the border security are still working side by side on each their own mandated tasks with little coordination and barely any cooperation. Ministerial approved Concept of Operations for IBM does not exist, although it is partly in the works, prompted and linked exclusively to the German lead pilot project on the Northern border. Synchronization of operations and procedures in the BCP facilities does not exist.

172. The idea of coordination and cooperation between the border security agencies has seen a slight progress on the management level in the sense that the joint Border Security Committee is having regular meetings and is promoting the concept. But at the local commander level, in particular at the operational level, there are still no significant signs of coordination or cooperation. There is none or very little cooperation or joint operations between the agencies, in particular in the shape of forward planning.

173. The information and intelligence sharing is based on each agency's assessment of whether it might fall into the field of responsibility of another. The information and intelligence flow is still almost exclusively vertical; and therefore much centralised.

174. Progress in locating BCP facilities closer to the physical border is proceeding slowly. Although plans for relocations at Aboudieh, Kaa and Masna do exist, all is pending final planning and funding. Even the BCP in Bokayaa, planned to open in the beginning of July, is located at a distance from the physical border with only a plan to move it forward. However nothing has been decided on the issue.

175. Development of SOPs for the BCP and reconstruction of same in order to achieve a division between in- and outgoing passengers has not seen any progress.

Equipment

176. The main radar in Beirut seaport was still not replaced after it was lost in the conflict last year. The passport control at the seaport has been improved with some basic document examination equipment and the passport control is better manned.

177. The passport control in Beirut International Airport has received basic document examination equipment. However, a procedure in the passport control resulting in the equipment being switched off only to be opened by a supervisor has limited the benefits of the equipment. Improvement was seen in the number of female officers, which is now considered to be adequate. The cargo terminal is now equipped with one (rather obsolete) X-ray machine as a supplement to manual search.

178. All BCPs are now in possession of passport verifiers. At BCP Masnaa, the planned container scanner is still not in place. The scanner is temporarily used in Beirut Seaport, awaiting construction of the foundations to be finalized at Masnaa. GC stated that the funds for the engineering work have not yet been released.

Training

179. Training in general on border-related issues is still not being performed. Most representatives of the agencies appeared to be waiting for international support on this issue. Some on-the-job training has apparently been performed on the passport examination equipment, as the officers on the ground typically had an adequate knowledge of the equipment.

General remarks

180. Overall, progress seems to be moving forward at a rather slow pace. On the management level of the agencies, there is a declared will to improve border security and a consensus on the advantages of the principles of coordination and cooperation as well as of the Integrated Border Management concept. Very little information or implementation of measures has so far seen the daylight at the lower command levels or on the ground.

181. The delaying factor appears to be the reluctance to introduce any new measures in the border security until after the evaluation of the Pilot Project on the Northern border. It is, however, worth noticing that a number of the recommendations in both the DPKO reports and in this LIBAT report can easily be implemented requiring neither external support, noticeable funding nor structural changes and without waiting the outcome of the Pilot Project.

V. Key recommendations

Based on the above assessment, the Lebanese Independent Border Assessment Team proposes the following recommendations :

Recommendation no 1

182. Establish a Multi-agency mobile force focusing on arms smuggling with the purpose of creating seizure results within a short time span through its intelligence and rapid interception capabilities. Additional purpose would be to serve as the “role-model” for the other border security agencies and to serve as a platform for a possible future dedicated border guard agency.

Recommendation no 2

183. Establish an Intelligence & Analysis component embedded within the Multi-agency unit with the purpose of gaining access to all border security relevant intelligence from the four agencies, analyse and provide the four agencies and the Multi-agency force with targets identified with a high likelihood of a positive apprehension.

Recommendation no 3

184. Deploy international border security experts to:

- a) the Multi-agency unit and its embedded intelligence and analysis cell
- b) all four agencies on all levels, but in particular on the operational level in order to advise on non-military border security aspects and follow up on performed training
- c) an advisory secretariat consisting of both international advisors and representatives from the Lebanese border security agencies, that will collect, analyse and disseminate information and lessons learned.

Recommendation no 4

185. Establish a dedicated Border Guard agency as part of a long term strategy in order to streamline border security execution, gather all expertise, information and intelligence in one agency, releasing in particular LAF and GS resources for their traditional tasks.

Recommendation no 5

186. Establish full and absolute control over Border Crossing Points by:

- a) creating Standard Operation Procedures for the BCPs including regulations for any movement inside the control area of persons, vehicles and goods, standardized obligatory measures for checking same, anti corruption mechanisms etc.
- b) implementing one-stop-control philosophy, where all components of person and cargo control is performed in one spot jointly by the concerned agencies
- c) fencing the perimeter of the control area
- d) redesign building location and layout where appropriate

Recommendation no 6

187. Initiate measures to separate legal and illegal border-near or border crossing activities with the purpose of creating a transparent and unambiguous environment including:

- a) blocking the maximum number of border crossing roads and trails and non vital roads in border near areas,
- b) establish mechanisms for cross-border social movement with dedicated crossing points,
- c) increase the number of legal BCPs by establishing a number of small BCP's for light traffic and social movement where applicable,
- d) clearly mark the agreed parts of the borderline,
- e) move BCP facilities to physical border
- f) combating smuggling tradition through socio-economic programs offering an alternative income for petty smugglers in order to decrease their large numbers.

Recommendation no 7

188. Establish training programs for the four agencies, and all levels within these, in order to transform the border security concept and doctrines into a highly professional and skilled civilian mindset, if possible building on or drawing from the training aspect of the Northern Border Pilot Project, including among other subjects:

- a) cross agency competences,
- b) technical skills concerning search techniques, knowledge of explosives manufacturing components
- c) human capacity concerning profiling techniques, intelligence gathering, risk analysis,
- d) concept of cooperation, coordination and IBM
- e) non-military border security tactical skills
- f) IBM concept training including studies outside Lebanon

Recommendation no 8

189. Continue and enhance border specific equipment support for all agencies with the purpose of increasing efficiency and serve as force multiplier including among others:

- a) surveillance equipment suitable for night observations and operations,
- b) surveillance equipment suitable for airborne surveillance: UAV, helicopters
- c) 4x4 vehicles to ensure a higher level of mobility and less visible patrolling.
- d) reliable communications systems will enable small and light unit patrols to be undertaken without having to rely heavily on strength in numbers.

- e) cargo scanners at certain Border Crossing Points, hand-held metal detectors, density and explosives detectors.
- f) additional basic and advanced documents examination equipment
- g) explosives canines and canine patrols.

Recommendation no 9

190. Upgrade IT capacity and capability by:

- a) upgrading existing data storage capacity
- b) improving or establish inter-agency computerized information exchange
- c) implementing the “Fingerprint Project” (central registration of fingerprints for ID- and passport holders)

Recommendation no 10

191. Establish a reward system for outstanding professional performances

Recommendation no 11

192. Establish cooperation with Syrian counterparts, also and in particular at the operational level, as a precondition for an optimum in border security management is a joint effort to secure the border and prevent illegal cross-border activities

Annex 1

LIBAT Visits & Meetings List

Sunday 270507

- Arrival to Beirut

Monday 280507

- Maj. General Ashraf Riffi, Chief of Internal Security Forces and Head of Border Security Committee
- Milos Strugar, UNIFIL Dir. of Civilian/Political Affairs
- Mr. Geir O. Pedersen, UN Special Coordinator for the Secretary General for Lebanon,

Tuesday 290507

- General Wafic Jezzini, General Security, Director General
- General Assad Ghanem, General Customs Director General
- General Siham Harakeh, General Security
- Border Security Committee

Wednesday 300507

- General Michel Sleimann, Commander of Lebanese Armed Forces
- German Pilot Project Team, General Detlef Karioth
- Informal Donor Coordination Group

Thursday 310507

- Beirut Seaport, Director General Hassan Kraytem
- Beirut Airport

Friday 010607

- Border Crossing Point Kaa
- Green Border location near El Qasr (IV)
- Green Border location at Haouch Beit Ismail (V)
- Green Border location between El Qaa and Beit Hira (VI)

Saturday 020607

- Green Border location near Qoussaya (VIII)
- Border Crossing Point Masnaa
- Green Border area near Deir el Aachayer (IX)

Monday 040607

- Border Crossing Point Masnaa
- Governor of Bekaa and Chtaura Provinces Antoine Suleiman in Zahle
- General Customs Regional Director of Bekaa Region Fouard Harb in Chtaura

Tuesday 050607

- Border Crossing Point Arida
- Green Border area between El Aarida and Tell Bin (I)
- Border Crossing Point Aboudieh
- Green Border location near El Abboudiye (II)

- Border Crossing Point Bokayaa
- Green Border area east of Sahlet el Bqaiiaa pocket (III)

Wednesday 060607

- Senior Advisor of the Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Shattar
- Mr. Geir O. Pedersen, UN Special Coordinator for the Secretary General for Lebanon

Thursday 070607

- General Customs General Director Assad Chenem in Beirut
- General Customs Audit and Anti-smuggling Division, Chief Ahmad Naser in Beirut

Friday 080607

- Implementation Unit for Northern Border Pilot Project, Col. Hamid Iskandar in MoD, Beirut

Monday 110607

- UNHCR Senior Protection Officer Ayaki Ito
- German Pilot Project Team, General Detlef Karioth

Tuesday 120607

- Green Border location at Jabal Lubnan Al Sharqi pocket (VII)
- Green Border location near Haloua (X)

Wednesday 130607

- Civil Aviation Authority, General Director Dr. Hamdi Shawk
- Maj. General Ashraf Riffi, Chief of Internal Security Forces and Head of Border Security Committee

Thursday 140607

- Informal Donor Coordination Group
- Border Security Committee
- Prime Minister Fouad Siniora


Friday 150607

- Airborne assessment of Green Border from El Aarida to Rayak (XI)

Saturday 160607

- Departure Beirut to NY

(Roman Digits in Green Border locations refer to location on map, see annex 2)



- BORDER CROSSING POINT
- GREEN BORDER LOCATION FIELD VISIT
Number reference see report page 29
- XI ROUTE OF AIRBORNE BORDER ASSESSMENT

Annex 3

Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team

Terms of Reference

Introduction

Paragraph 14 of resolution 1701 (2006) “calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and all entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel” Paragraph 15 of the same resolution outlines measures that States should take to prevent the supply of arms or other military assistance to any entity or individual other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL.

In its Presidential Statement of 12 December 2006 (S/PRST/2006/52), the Security Council, responding to the Secretary-General’s letter dated 1 December 2006 (S/2006/933) to its President, had noted the conclusions of a UN team of border police experts, dispatched in September 2006 by the Secretary-General at the request of the Government of Lebanon (GOL) and invited “the Secretary-General to pursue further technical and independent assessment of the situation along the border and to report back to the Council on further findings and recommendations.”

The latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2007/147) of 14 March 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) notes the second visit of the same team of border police experts during the reporting period and its observations that a lack of critical equipment and training provided to the relevant Lebanese authorities continues to hamper serious efforts to properly secure Lebanon’s land border with Syria. The report calls for further urgent assistance to be provided to the Lebanese authorities, in particular to enhance their border security capacities and welcomes the ongoing bilateral assistance that is being provided by the Government of Germany in this regard.

The report also suggested that the Security Council consider supporting further steps, such as an independent assessment mission, to ensure the full implementation of paragraph 15, including the arms embargo. In its Presidential statement of 17 April, the Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s intention to evaluate the situation along the entire (Lebanon-Syria) border and invited him “to dispatch at the earliest, in close liaison with the Lebanese Government, an independent assessment mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border ... and to report back to the Council ... on its findings and recommendations in this regard.”

Mandate

In close liaison with all relevant Lebanese authorities, including the recently-appointed Border Security Committee, and its member agencies, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Internal Security Forces, the Sûreté Générale, and Customs, as well as other interested parties that the Team may need to talk to, the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team shall fully assess current border security and the monitoring of the “Green border”, including its official crossing points.

The Team shall provide specific recommendations to the Secretary-General, on measures and assistance strategies leading to the enhancement of border security along the entire length of Lebanon’s approximately 320km border with the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Team shall review the roles of all the above-mentioned agencies, with particular attention to current national customs and border monitoring capacities, as well as progress made by security and

customs agencies in strengthening their control of the border in compliance with resolution 1701 (2006), and identify major obstacles hindering the effective strengthening of that control.

The Team shall analyze the findings of the previous border police expert team's two visits to Lebanon (in September 2006 and February 2007) and build on its recommendations, with specific focus on the designing of an integrated border management project, as well as possible training and development opportunities, working in close consultation with the above-mentioned agencies and with German experts, currently conducting a bilateral assistance pilot project on border security enhancement in the north of the country.

The Team shall also liaise closely with the aforementioned German team and with above-mentioned agencies and develop a set of standards for border entry points, including recommendations on the reconstruction and refurbishment of critical infrastructure along the border.

Main Activities

The main activities recommended for the Team shall include:

- Meet with relevant Lebanese security agencies, UN, bilateral partners and other relevant parties to discuss and enquire into all aspects of efforts to ensure the security of the Lebanese-Syrian border.
- Visit and inspect multiple points along the "Green Border" and the official crossing points between Lebanon and Syria.
- Review existing security arrangements, types of equipment in use by the relevant Lebanese authorities as well as other official procedures in use (for the official crossings).
- Consult closely with the previous team of border police experts, relevant German experts, and others providing border security assessments or technical assistance, in making any further recommendations on assistance, training and equipment to be provided to enhance border security.

Specifically, it is recommended that in Lebanon, the Team shall liaise closely with the GOL and shall for this purpose endeavour to meet and liaise with the following interlocutors among others:

- Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense / Interior and other relevant Government officials;
- LAF Commander;
- Heads of Internal Security Forces, Sûreté Générale, Military Intelligence;
- Lebanese Chiefs of Police and other Border Services (Customs and Immigrations).

Qualifications and Appointment

Appointed by the Secretary-General, the Team should be small and comprised of senior border security, police / customs, and possibly military experts who will be employed by the United Nations on a full-time basis for a period of up to two months. The experts could be seconded for the purpose of this task from member states that have personnel with the relevant experience and expertise. Assistance could also be provided by UN personnel (current or former) as deemed appropriate.

All members of the Team shall have the status of experts on mission for the United Nations. They shall benefit from the privileges and immunities provided for in Articles VI and VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations during the period of their mission. They shall be subject to the *Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of*

Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission, as adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/280 of 27 March 2002.

Logistics and Support

DPA will be the “Lead” Department in support of the Team and will continue to work in close consultation with relevant UN Departments and agencies, particularly DPKO.

Lebanese authorities, relevant UN agencies and missions in Lebanon and/or elsewhere in the region will support the team in Lebanon with all required logistical and security-related assistance and facilitate all transportation/travel as necessary.

Cooperation with the GOL

The GOL shall ensure the freedom of movement of the members of the Team and of its secretariat throughout Lebanon.

The GOL shall ensure the security of the members of the Team and their secretariat while deployed in Lebanon.

The Team shall enjoy the full cooperation of the GOL and, in particular, of the Government agencies mentioned in the TOR. It should be accompanied by the competent Lebanese authorities during field visits.

The GOL shall accord to (i) the members of the Team the privileges and immunities, facilities and exemptions enjoyed by experts on mission for the United Nations, as provided for in Articles VI and VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which Lebanon is party, and (ii) the secretariat of the Team the privileges and immunities, facilities and exemptions enjoyed by officials of the United Nations, as provided for in Articles V and VII of that Convention.

Reporting

A detailed report on the Team’s findings, with options/recommendations/next steps, shall be submitted for the attention of the Secretary-General not later than two weeks after the completion of the field visit(s).

Funding

Subject to the Secretary-General’s approval, the Team shall be funded from the Secretary-General’s Unforeseen and Extraordinary Budget Account.

End/-