We can't give Syria everything
Yossi Olmert
Jerusalem Post:   The Syrian-Israeli peace process is still alive but not well, yet rumors about its death are premature. Exchanges of messages continue on various levels through secret channels. This kind of communication may be explained by reasons of inertia, prestige, and political expediency of the three main players, Clinton, Barak, and Assad. The latter is ailing, visibly frail, and on the verge of the end of his political career, but he still maintains at least two of the qualities for which he has become renowned - patience and resolve. Consequently, he is not likely to back off from the main principles of his peace strategy: complete unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 lines, without any redemarcation of them, as is demanded by Barak; no meaningful normalization, not now and not in the future; reciprocal (and inadequate, from Israel's standpoint) security arrangements, and continuation of the pressure on Israel from Lebanon so long as it serves Syria's purposes. Whether all this would amountto a real, meaningful, and honorable peace is up for interpretation. Remember, however, that this is Assad.
He has no public to report to. Israeli and international public opinion make no impression on him either, and he has no sense of urgency. According to some unverified reports, he intimated to Clinton that he could wait for years. Bearing in mind his own personal condition, either the man is extremely optimistic or he is really interested in one type of peace - one which he dictates to Israel. It follows that if something will be achieved in the near future, it will be exactly that, but will it be peace? Ehud Barak is in real danger of being pushed into a corner from which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to extricate himself and the State of Israel. He is still capable of doing it, but that depends on adopting a different strategy from the current one, with Lebanon as its focal point.
Israel should suspend all negotiations with Syria until completing its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Then Israel should place a condition on the resumption of negotiations. Syria should make a commitment to prevent any provocation against Israel from Lebanese territory for at least nine months. After that, negotiations could resume. Barak should make clear that any such provocation would inevitably and immediately lead to an unprecedented Israeli reaction against Syrian targets in Lebanon first, and then in Syria itself. Obviously, this is not a risk-free strategy. Assad may be tempted to test Barak's resolve, perhaps also to call his bluff.
Barak, for his part, will have to stand firmly behind his warnings. There is always the danger of escalation which could deteriorate to a full-scale confrontation. Such a scenario cannot be dismissed, though the likelihood is very small. Assad may be really obstinate when it comes to political gestures and concessions, but his record of 30 years shows that he is not an adventurer. He knows full well that Israel has a clear strategic military advantage over his ill-equipped army. He also knows that if peace with Israel could undermine the succession process in Syria, a war could completely wreck it.
Clearly, if by chance Syria resumes talks with Israel (and currently that seems to be a distant prospect) , when the Lebanese situation is calm, Israel will still have to pay dearly to terminate its conflict with Syria. But paying dearly is not paying everything and succumbing to a diktat. The writer is an expert on Syria and an adviser to former defense minister Moshe Arens.
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