Barak and Assad, the terrible twins
By Yoel Marcus
With each passing day, I become more and more convinced that there is an incredible similarity between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian President Hafez Assad. There is a certain resemblance as far as personality is concerned, and a striking resemblance regarding the political problems that face each of them. From the perspective of personality, the common denominator is the fact that no one knows what either leader really thinks. Both Barak and Assad are extreme introverts. Whereas Assad's introversion is written all over his face, Barak's inward-looking personality is expressed in his friendly slaps on the back and in his smiles. Both of them are experts in jabberwocky-like, long-winded, convoluted and essentially ambiguous, open-ended statements that can be interpreted any way you like (although your interpretation might not necessarily be what they are really saying). No one - including their Cabinet ministers and close associates - knows what their actual intentions are when they talk about peace.
When Assad says that there is a wide gap between the Syrian and Israeli positions, does he mean what he says, or is he just trying to improve his bargaining posture? When Barak says that we have reached the final limits of our concessions, does he really mean "final," or is he just bargaining? It is impossible to determine when Assad and Barak are being tactical and when they are being strategic, when their "yes" is really a "no" and when their "no" is really a "yes." Both of them are dictators - while one of them relies on the law of the bayonet, the other relies on the crushing majority he obtained in democratic elections. However, due to their personalities, there is precious little difference between Assad's dictatorial regime and Barak's democratic one, because both of them make all their decisions without relying on any outside counsel and with everyone else in the dark as to their next move.
In the political sphere, both Assad and Barak desperately need a peace treaty, although both of them talk tough and claim that they are prepared to wait patiently until a peace can be worked out between their two nations. Both of them have serious domestic political problems. Assad is very sick and is now involved in the delicate operation of transferring power to his son; thus he needs to reclaim the very territory he himself lost to Israel. Barak needs a peace treaty with Syria, because a final status agreement with the Palestinians is a much trickier business. Assad no longer has the Soviet Union to back him and is essentially without any external military or diplomatic support; thus he needs American backing, but America will not budge unless he signs a peace treaty with Israel. Barak does have America's support; however, a failure to obtain peace with Syria will expose the serious socioeconomic problems that he has not yet solved. Thus he may have America behind him, but if he fails on the peace front, he might not have Israel.
Assad and Barak are two difficult nuts to crack. Both of them are facing extreme pressure in the wake of Barak's decision to make a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The whole business of this withdrawal sounds like a very bad joke: The "brilliant tactic" of setting a July 7 deadline for the Israeli pullback, which was intended to pressure Assad into resuming peace talks with Israel, has backfired and become a trap for both leaders. Assad really wanted to renew the talks but, when we did not hear what we wanted to hear, a pullout without a peace treaty has, from the perspective of military experts, become a severe security risk that could produce a war along our northern frontier. Both leaders have nerves of steel and both of them have started to intimidate one another. Barak has tried to intimidate Assad with his threats and with his information leaks that he will order an earlier withdrawal under the aegis of the United Nations. Assad has tried to intimidate Barak with his threats that terrorist operations against Israel will continue if our departure from Lebanon is not accompanied by a peace treaty. Barak has responded to this threat with the counter-threat that he will step up the peace talks with the Palestinians. Assad, in turn, has threatened to activate the Palestinian rejectionist front from his side of our northern border.
In response, Barak has threatened tough military retaliation. In the process of this escalation, each of the two leaders has estimated where the point of no return is - that is, at what stage the face-off could deteriorate. Assad has begun to realize that, with his stubbornness, he might end up losing not only the Golan but also America and Lebanon - because, sooner or later, he will be forced to leave Lebanon. When that happens, Syria would lose what Hong Kong represents for totalitarian China: an entry point for capitalist revenues. Meanwhile, Barak is under pressure, because if a withdrawal minus a peace treaty escalates from terrorism to all-out war, he might be thrown out of office.  The two leaders are now in the same boat as they wage psychological warfare against one another. What we must ask ourselves is: Who will make fewer concessions? In this battle, the question is not who will blink first, because they have both blinked already. Barak is willing to give up immense assets, while Assad is willing to give up his entire worldview. The battle is, in fact, over the gap between the two. This is the very same gap that - in the view of U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Hassan of Morocco and King Abdullah of Jordan - is almost microscopic. As the July 7 deadline draws near, both Assad and Barak will be subjected to ever greater pressure. They will try to talk and act like John Wayne, but they will also try to come up with new formulas. Neither Assad nor Barak can afford to fail, because failure would mean paying a heavy political and personal price. The urgent invitation that American President Bill Clinton has given to Barak, who will be meeting his host tonight, may perhaps be the harbinger of the miracle of the resuscitation of the moribund Syrian-Israeli peace process. I am not saying that the messiah has arrived, but he might be phoning us right now.
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